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Abstract 
This thesis aims to explore whether and how (monetary) remittance affects 
petty corruption in migrants’ countries of origin. Specifically, it investigates whether 
remittance recipients are more likely to pay bribes than non-recipients. Two arguments 
are put forward. On one hand, monetary remittance facilitates the circulation of positive 
social remittance from migrants working/residing in less corrupt countries to their 
families back home, which makes the latter less likely to think that paying a bribe is 
justifiable, hence lower actual bribe payment. On the other hand, compared to those not 
receiving remittance, recipients are exposed to a higher probability of being targeted for 
bribes and, therefore, more prone to pay bribes as the positive social remittances may 
not be robust enough to replace the particularistic culture of corrupt societies. The 
results from multilevel modeling of household survey data from 16 countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in 2014 support the second argument. Although I failed to 
find consistent supporting evidence that those that receive remittances from abroad are 
also more likely to actually pay bribes, it does not necessarily mean a better state of 
affairs. Remittance recipients are more likely to find it justifiable to pay a bribe and be 
targeted for bribe solicitations by public officials than non-recipients. These grim 
findings may be explained by the combination of limited or weak transmission of 
positive social remittance and the persistence of the particularistic culture shaping the 
way a corrupt society functions. The policy implications from this study are essential in 
the context of numerous efforts to curb corruption and harness the positive gains from 
remittance in migrants’ countries of origin.  
 
Key words: monetary remittance, social remittance, migration, petty corruption, sending 
countries, bribe payment, bribe solicitation, multilevel model, particularistic culture, 
political networks, social networks. 
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I. Introduction 
Corruption is probably no longer a new phenomenon. One search with the key 
word “corruption” in Google Search generates about 146,000,000 results1. Corruption, 
understood as the “misuse of public office for private gain” (Treisman, 2000), has been 
consistently found to have detrimental consequences on economic growth (Mauro, 
1995), interpersonal trust among citizens in the society (Rothstein, 2013), efficient 
resource allocation (Krueger, 1974), political legitimacy of the state (Rose-Ackerman, 
1996), and so on. Determinants of corruption, mostly at the cross-national level, have 
been identified in order to curb corruption, such as freedom of press, colonial origin, 
religion, level of economic development (Treisman, 2000), the degree of female 
participation in government (Dollar et al., 2001), political institutions (Gerring and 
Thacker, 2004; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2003; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Persson et 
al, 2003; Chang and Golden, 2007), etc. 
These studies utilize aggregate corruption data, which makes it relatively easy 
to compare corruption level across countries and over time. However, these data tell us 
very little about the corruption experience at micro-level (Svensson, 2002). Why does 
corruption occur, i.e. why do people engage in corrupt exchange? The answer to this 
question necessitates research on individual/household characteristics, which prompt 
people to participate in corrupt transactions in the first place (Tavits, 2005). 
Furthermore, aggregate data cannot explain within-country variations regarding 
corruption behaviour (Svensson, 2002), i.e. some people are more prone to corrupt 
behaviour than others. 
For these reasons, another branch of literature on corruption is devoted to 
exploring which individual/household characteristics matter when it comes to a 
person’s decision to engage in petty corruption, i.e. corruption involving ordinary 
people. Petty corruption refers to bribery that involves only low-level administrators 
and citizens who need to acquire license, approval, or so from the bureaucrats 
(Dahlström, 2011, p.4)2, i.e. to gain access to public services. The results of the studies 
range from individual socio-demographic characteristics, including gender (Swamy et al, 
2001; Mocan, 2004), education, wealth (Mocan, 2004), age (Guerrero and Rodriguez-
Oreggia, 2008), to individual perceptions of the spread of corruption (Tavits, 2005) and 
personal social and political networks (Rose and Peiffer, 2013), etc. This thesis focuses 
on yet another important feature which has been neglected in previous research, i.e. 
whether a person receives remittances or not.  
                                                             
1 Author’s own calculation. 
2 This is to distinguish petty corruption from grand corruption. Grand corruption refers to “misuse of 
public office on the higher levels within the state” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p.27). Corruption at this level 
generally involves both politicians and bureaucrats (Dahlström, 2011, p.4), but not ordinary citizens. The 
terms “petty corruption” and “bribery” are used interchangeably hereafter. 
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Remittance, here defined as the transfer in cash or kind from international 
migrants to their families and/or relatives who reside in the sending countries3, has 
attracted a lot of attention from both policy makers and scholars during the last few 
decades. Remittance flows have been reported as a large and steadily growing financial 
source for developing countries, projected to reach US$435 billion in 2015 (World Bank, 
2015, p.3). Remittances are demonstrated to be considerably larger than other capital 
flows to developing countries. For instance, they were more than three times as large as 
official development assistance to these countries in 2014 (World Bank, 2015, p.3).  
Remittances have been found to play an important role in transforming 
different aspects of life, in both positive and negative directions, in home countries (de 
Haas, 2007). For millions of people in the developing world, remittances have 
increasingly become a crucial source of income insurance and livelihoods, especially in 
times of hardship (de Haas, 2007, p.8; Lubambu, 2014, p.18). Remittances help improve 
women’s position in the society, thereby reducing gender inequality (Orozco and Ellis, 
2013, p.10). Furthermore, remittances may be used to fund community projects and 
remittance recipients become more active in local administration and able to recognize 
corruption (Tyburski, 2012, p.342). Yet, in the short run, these remitted incomes may 
foster dependency on migrants’ transfers, reduce the recipients’ participation in 
working force, while increasing their consumption rather than channeling this funding 
source to domestic investments or savings (Lubambu, 2014, p.22; de Haas, 2007, p.14). 
Remittances may also be used to support conflicts in both sending and receiving 
countries (Lubambu, 2014, p.21). 
Evidences of the relationship between remittance and corruption have mainly 
been found at cross-national level (Tyburski, 2012; Tyburski, 2014; Abdih et al, 2012; 
Ahmed, 2013; Berdiev et al, 2013). Based on national and sub-national data, scholars 
generally agree that remittance does affect corruption in sending countries. However, 
the direction of the relationship is ambiguous depending on specific circumstances of 
these countries. The effect of remittance on corruption-related attitudes and behaviors 
of ordinary people, i.e. remittance recipients, has, most of the time, been overlooked. The 
only study up to now that has touched on this topic is Ivlevs and King (2014), using data 
                                                             
3 According to the United Nations Technical Subgroup on the Movement of Persons (Alfieri and Havinga, 
2006), “personal remittances” are defined as the sum of personal transfers, i.e. transfers in cash or kind 
between resident and non-resident households, and compensation of employees, i.e. net compensation of 
short-term employment in another economy. The term “remittance” used in this thesis refers to the 
inflows to a household in the sending country from a household member working abroad.  
The terms “sending countries”, “countries of origin” and “home countries” are used interchangeably to 
refer to migrants’ countries of birth. The terms “receiving countries”, “destination countries” and “host 
countries” denote the countries migrants move to, regardless of whether they have acquired citizenships 
of those countries or not. 
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on six Balkan countries. The debate, consequently, lacks contribution from studies using 
micro data.  
This thesis aims to clarify the ambiguous relationship between remittance and 
corruption by exploring whether and how remittance affects petty corruption (or 
bribery) in sending countries. The main research question is: are remittance recipients 
more likely to pay bribes than non-recipients? 
To answer this question, the thesis employs a quantitative approach utilizing 
multilevel modeling of household survey data in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 
where both remittances and corruption play important roles in daily life. The results 
indicate that remittance recipients are substantially more likely to think that paying a 
bribe is a justifiable act, to be prone to bribe solicitations, but not significantly more 
likely to pay bribes than non-recipients.  
The contributions of the thesis are three-fold. First, it verifies the result of Ivlevs 
and King (2014), using new data, i.e. data from Latin America, thereby enriching the 
literature on the relationship between remittance and corruption at micro level. Second, 
it validates the findings of the previous research on individual determinants of 
corruption and extends this branch of literature by examining the role of remittance 
receipt. Last but not least, the thesis highlights the significance of social remittance as 
ideas and practices transmitted from migrants to their families4 in control of corruption 
in sending countries. The study provides essential policy implications, which necessitate 
consideration in the context of numerous efforts to curb corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2006, p.86) and harness the positive gains from remittances in these countries 
(Tyburski, 2012, p.339). 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of previous research 
on the individual determinants of corruption and the remittance-corruption 
relationship. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework based on relevant theories and 
proposes hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the data source, variables and methodology to 
test the hypotheses. Empirical results are reported in Section 5, which is followed by 
interpretation and discussion of the results in Section 6. Section 7 wraps up the findings 
and posits the contributions in the research field. This section also sheds light on policy 
implications and discusses limitations as well as suggestions for future research. 
II. Previous research 
1. Individual determinants of corruption 
                                                             
4 See Section III for detailed explanations. 
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This branch of literature emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
incentives and mechanisms of corruption at micro-level in fighting corruption.  
It is often found that individual socio-demographic features matter when it 
comes to explaining individual incentives and decisions to commit corruption acts. Men 
are found to be more prone to corruption than women (Swamy et al, 2001; Guerrero and 
Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Mocan, 2004). Women may be more honest or more risk 
averse than men and may find it necessary to set a good example for their children while 
teaching them about honesty (Swamy et al, 2001). It can also be the case that men may 
be more active in the labour market than women, which exposes men more frequently 
to public officials (Mocan, 2004). People of older age (over 60 years old) may be less 
prone to corruption than those who are younger, because they may have less frequent 
contact with government officials (Mocan, 2004). 
People with higher income are more likely to pay bribes (Mocan, 2004; 
Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008). Due to their higher earning capacity, they may 
be more likely to be asked for bribes by government officials (Mocan, 2004), or have a 
higher opportunity cost, i.e. time becomes more valuable for them than for those with 
lower income, hence higher probability to pay bribes to avoid wasting time (Guerrero 
and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008).  
Findings regarding the role of education in determining an individual’s 
involvement in corruption vary. Rose and Peiffer (2014) hypothesized that highly 
educated people may be less likely to pay bribes thanks to their knowledge of the public 
services they are entitled to, yet they found no significant impact of education on bribe 
payment. Meanwhile, Mocan (2004) and Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) 
arrived at a significant positive relationship between education and bribery, i.e. the 
higher the education level, the more likely a person is to pay bribes. This is due to the 
argument that, like those with high income, highly educated people tend to be solicited 
for bribes when contacting government officials (Mocan, 2004), or have a higher 
opportunity cost and therefore more likely to pay bribes (Guerrero and Rodriguez-
Oreggia, 2008). 
A person’s decision to engage in corrupt exchanges is also found to be affected 
by his/her definition of whether corruption is acceptable, and perception of how 
widespread corruption is (Tavits, 2005). The more a person defines corruption as an 
acceptable act, the more likely he/she is to engage in it. In addition, the more 
widespread corruption is perceived to be, the more prone to corruption an individual 
becomes. This finding reflects how the association and interaction with other people in 
the society foster one’s imitation of deviant behaviours, and corrupt behaviour can be 
considered as one of them (Tavits, 2005). 
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The connection among people within the society is also demonstrated through a 
person’s social and political networks, which are found by Rose and Peiffer (2014) to be 
crucial in determining his/her engagement in corruption. Social networks refer to face-
to-face connection among individuals in the locality, while political networks denote 
first-hand contact between an individual and public officials (Rose and Peiffer, 2014). 
Social networks are formed through participation in solving a community problem and 
attendance in meetings of different associations, such as parent associations, community 
improvement groups, professional or merchant associations. Meanwhile, political 
networks are built through contacts and requests for support from officials at different 
levels, including municipality, ministry and legislature, and through attendance in 
municipal meetings. Those that belong to a social network do not necessarily have 
political connections (Rose and Peiffer, 2013). Using data from the Afrobarometer 
survey in 2005 with 18 countries, Rose and Peiffer (2014) found that those having social 
and/or political networks are more likely to pay bribes than those that do not belong to 
any network because the former could make use of the networks to find out who to 
bribe and monitor if the bribe takers deliver the service. This finding is contrary to the 
theoretical expectation by Putnam et al (1993), i.e. such networks can come to one’s 
advantage to get access to services without having to pay bribes. 
While focusing on individual determinants of corruption, this branch of 
literature also highlights several contextual factors that may affect a person’s decision to 
engage in corrupt acts. Examples include the country’s legal origin (Mocan, 2004; Rose 
and Peiffer, 2014), uninterrupted democracy, institutional strength (Mocan, 2004), free 
press (Rose and Peiffer, 2013, 2014), ethnic fractionalization (Rose and Peiffer, 2014). 
These results are in line with those of the studies on corruption at cross-national level 
mentioned above. 
It can be seen that the relationship between remittance and corruption has not 
at all been discussed in this body of literature, to which I now turn in the next part. 
2. The relationship between remittance and corruption 
How may remittance and corruption be connected? The lion share of previous 
research focused on cross-national variances and pointed out two main mechanisms 
through which remittance may have ambiguous influence on aggregate corruption in 
home countries. 
First, remittance may have detrimental effect on institutional quality, including 
corruption, in the same way as natural resource rents do. The natural resource curse 
theory states that as governments can substitute the resource windfalls for (income) 
taxes to finance their activities, citizens may be bought by patronage or simply have 
fewer incentives to monitor and hold the government accountable, hence lower 
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institutional quality (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Abdih et al (2012) showed 
that remittance inflows may influence the government’s incentives through one or both 
of the following two channels. On one hand, as private income transfers, remittances are 
not directly taxed as personal income, yet they expand the base for other taxes (VAT, 
etc.), increasing the resources in the government’s hands. On the other hand, the 
availability of remittances enables households to purchase private goods (that are 
substitutes for public goods) rather than rely on the government to provide them. 
Therefore, the cost of government corruption becomes less costly for the households to 
bear. Both ways make it easier for the government to divert resources for its own 
purposes. The proposition was tested in a cross-section analysis of 111 countries and 
robust to the control of reverse causality. Berdiev et al (2013) and Ahmed (2013) 
arrived at the similar results that remittances deteriorate institutional quality, though 
they used different methods. The former used panel data of 111 countries during 1986–
2010, while the latter took advantage of a natural experiment of 57 poor, non-oil-
producing countries during 1984-2004.  
Second, remittances may exert both positive and negative effects on aggregate 
corruption in sending countries depending on how remittances interact with both the 
governments’ and migrants’ incentives. Tyburski (2014) argued that politicians react to 
remittances by diverting resources from public services towards patronage, but 
migrants and remittance receivers may use remittances as a leverage to hold politicians 
accountable. In the end, the aggregate effect of remittance on control of corruption 
depends on the regime type. Empirical analyses of panel data from 127 developing 
states between 2000 and 2010 suggested that as remittance flows increase, 
authoritarian regimes will have worse control of corruption than democracies 
(Tyburski, 2014). In closed regimes, the government requires a smaller supporting 
coalition and the costs of political activity are higher for migrants and remittance 
recipients, hence lower probability of influencing corruption. In contrast, democratic 
regimes require larger supporting coalitions and provide more lower-cost participation 
opportunities, thereby enhancing the probability for migrants and remittance recipients 
to influence the government in their home countries (Tyburski, 2014). Likewise, 
Tyburski (2012) found that at regional level in Mexico during 2001-2007, the level of 
corruption is lower in states receiving more remittances. In the context of political 
competition in Mexico, he emphasized that these remitted incomes enable receivers to 
participate in political activity and vote for opposition parties, thus increasing 
government accountability.  
This branch of literature, so far, has hardly paid attention to the individual-level 
mechanism, i.e. how remittances may affect a recipient’s propensity to engage in 
corruption acts. The closest study to this thesis is Ivlevs and King (2014), which 
explored the impacts of migration and remittances on corruption experiences of 
migrants’ family members back home. They used data from the Gallup Balkan Monitor 
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survey in six countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia) over two years (repeated country cross-section in 2010 and 
2011). They found that families with migrants, especially those also receiving monetary 
remittances, are more prone to bribe solicitations by public officials. However, 
households having connections with migrants (regardless of whether they receive 
monetary remittances or not) are less likely to pay bribes than those without migrants. 
This is interpreted as a positive effect of migrants’ transmission of good practices from 
host countries to home countries. Yet, the authors argue that this positive effect can be 
offset by monetary remittances. It is because if households also receive remittances, 
they will be more targeted by public officials for extortion, or more willing and able to 
pay bribes (though the relationship between remittances and actual bribery is not 
significant). This finding is contrary to the inference we can make from the above-
mentioned studies at cross-national level, i.e. to the extent that bribes are exchanged for 
access to public services (Rose and Peiffer, 2014), ordinary citizens’ bribe payment 
should decrease because remittances have removed the need to rely on the government 
for the provision of public services. Furthermore, Ivlevs and King (2014) simply posed 
the research question as an empirical issue, while there are sufficient theoretical works 
which can be connected to explain the phenomenon.  
In order to clarify this ambiguous relationship between remittances and 
individual corruption experiences, I present a theoretical framework in the next section 
by synthesizing relevant bodies of literature in migration studies. Instead of portraying 
the research question as an empirical issue, this framework explains in theoretical terms 
how remittances may influence a recipient’s bribe payment behavior via his/her 
attitude towards petty corruption and being solicited for bribes. Hypotheses are then 
put forward at the end of the section. 
III. Theoretical framework: How may remittances affect 
individual bribe payment behavior? 
1. Remittances and reduced bribe payment 
The departure point of this framework is the pertaining ties between migrants 
and their home countries. A number of studies have pointed out that migrants may 
maintain their connections with their countries of origin after leaving (Burgess, 2012; 
Hoffman, 2008; Levitt, 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Batista and Vicente, 2010; 
Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010; Vari-Lavoisier, 2014). Due to the loyalty bonds with 
their countries of origin, migrants may bring about political changes, including better 
governance, through their direct involvement in domestic political activities (Burgess, 
2012, p.48-51; Hoffman, 2008, p.10-12) and influences on international actors’ policies 
towards their home countries (Hoffman, 2008, p.10-12).  
  11 
Similarly, Levitt (1998) showed that migrants absorb and transmit to their 
families “social remittances”5, defined as “normative structures, systems of practice and 
social capital”. Normative structures include, for example, “expectations about 
organizational performance, such as how the church, state or the court should function”, 
and “norms about the role of clergy, judges and politicians” (Levitt, 1998, p.933). 
Systems of practice refer to “household labour, religious practices, and patterns of civil 
and political participation” (Levitt, 1998, p.934). Lastly, social capital means the prestige 
and status that migrants have acquired in destination countries and are utilized to their 
advantage (or disadvantage) at home. Social remittances are circulated between 
individuals, i.e. migrants and their families, when they exchange visits, when migrants 
return to reside in their home communities, through exchanges of communication, and 
even local television channels and Internet websites (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011, 
p.12). Social remittances can also be understood in a collective sense, which means ideas 
and practices transferred by individuals in their roles within the hometown associations 
(HTAs), political parties or church groups. A Hometown Association (HTA) is an 
organization formed by migrants coming from the same country of origin and living in 
the same destination country. Migrants can transfer money and resources to fund 
projects in their home countries through HTAs6. For instance, the social development 
projects implemented by the HTAs in their hometown in the Dominican Republic change 
the way community members demand provision of public goods and transparency and 
accountability from the government (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). This theory is 
linked to the accountability aspect in Tyburski (2012, 2014), i.e. migrants learn to abide 
by legal norms and demand accountability during their time in the destination countries 
and transmit back these lessons to the remittance recipients, so that both migrants and 
their families can hold officials accountable. Evidence about migration’s positive effect 
on the dissemination of democratic attitude and behaviours in their country of origin 
has also been documented elsewhere (Batista and Vicente, 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and 
Crow, 2010).  
Yet, Levitt (1998) and Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) contend that social 
remittances can have both positive and negative effects on home communities. It means 
that social remittance can promote or hinder the improvement of institutional quality in 
sending countries. The positive effects of social remittances are often attributed to the 
high quality of government in destination countries (Batista and Vicente, 2010)7. In the 
                                                             
5 The term “remittance” as the main focus of this thesis refers to the monetary, financial aspect. This 
meaning should be used whenever the term appears by itself. When put in the same sentence with the 
other term “social remittance”, it is mentioned explicitly as “monetary remittance”. 
6 The total number of HTAs around the world is unknown; however, according to Orozco and Garcia-
Zanello (2009), they exist among many migrant groups from different sending countries in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. 
7 Yet, Portes (2008) argued that the characteristics of migrants decide what remittances they transfer 
back. As a result, even in countries with relatively high institutional quality, the outcomes are 
heterogeneous. For instance, children of poor migrants from Central America to the United States (US) 
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case of corruption, it can be understood that migrants working or residing in countries 
with higher quality of institution than their countries of origin, may transfer back home 
those social remittances favorable for control of corruption, though what they are 
exactly have not been identified in the literature. As a result, migrants’ families and/or 
relatives at home may become less tolerant towards corruption. 
Examples of how social remittances have been used either by migrants 
themselves or their families back home to fight corruption in sending countries with the 
support of monetary remittance have been quite rare. Vari-Lavoisier (2014) took note of 
two cases in Senegal, where migrants living in Paris and being active members of the 
board of the HTA, came back home in Senegal for a short visit and influenced the local 
authorities to dismiss corrupt officials. According to Vari-Lavoisier (2014), migrants 
remitted money home through the HTA to fund different projects, for example, building 
a school, and this gave them the legitimacy to request changes towards better 
management. This point may suggest that control of corruption benefits from collective 
social remittance circulated through the HTA rather than social remittance transferred 
through the family sphere. However, I argue that to the extent that migrants are active in 
HTA and strongly oppose to corruption as in the cases in Senegal, it is possible that their 
social remittances may as well have been transmitted and adopted by their families.  
In short, remittance can be seen as an important token of migrants’ maintaining 
ties with their home countries (Vari-Lavoisier, 2014). Through this connection, migrants 
transfer what they have absorbed in foreign countries with higher institutional quality 
back to their families/relatives. I hypothesize that monetary remittances facilitate the 
circulation of these positive social remittances, which in turn may make the recipients 
less likely to find it justifiable to pay bribes and therefore lower the propensity to pay 
bribes. 
2. Remittances and increased bribe payment 
Remittance is often considered a sign of a better life. de Haas (2007, p.16) 
argues that after such basic consumption needs as food, health care, debt repayment and 
education of the children have been fulfilled, migrants and their families may start 
investing in housing and land, small-scale businesses and agriculture. Evidences were 
found in a number of sending countries, for example, Guatemala (Davis and Lopez-Carr, 
2010), El Salvado (Edwards and Ureta, 2003), Eritrea (Kifle, 2007), Philippines (Yang, 
2006), Mexico (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001), that remitted incomes were used to invest 
in children’s education, healthcare, build a new house, and/or establishing small 
enterprises. Most studies on the use of remittances seem to agree that households 
receiving remittances are more likely to invest than those without remittances, all else 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
participate in youth gangs, get deported and bring the culture of gang violence back to their sending 
countries (Portes, 2008, p.26-28). 
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equal (de Haas, 2007, p.14). 
The impacts of migration and remittances on investments and economic 
development of the sending communities have generally been found to be positive (de 
Haas, 2007, pp.14-18). Nevertheless, migrant status and remittance receipt expose 
migrants and their families to a higher probability of being solicited for bribes by public 
officials and/or private agents.  
On one hand, remittance recipients are more likely to be asked for bribes, 
insofar as they use remittances to pay for public services (health care, education, etc.) 
and/or invest in small businesses, which are often the target of bribe extortion. For 
instance, Chan et al (2009, p.287) noted a case, in the mid-1980s, of a family in Chen 
village, a small village in southern China, who used remittances from their son who was 
in Hong Kong to buy a secondhand minibus to run a transport service along the county’s 
main road. Yet, they could not maintain the business due to the large amount of bribes 
that police from each commune along the way extracted from them.  
On the other hand, migrant status and remittance receipt may make it easier to 
identify migrants and their families and, thus, make them more vulnerable to bribe 
solicitation. In the East and South-East Asia, when receiving remittance through banks, 
recipients were reportedly asked for bribes by bank officers, who intentionally delayed 
the payment for this purpose (Ullah, 2016, pp.168-169). Mexican migrants, who return 
home from the US for holidays, are often stopped on the way by Mexican police, who 
then demand an amount of money for not seizing the migrants’ vehicles.  
“…Mexican immigrants remain "perfect targets" for low-paid police officers looking to 
supplement their incomes… Police "know the migrants have dollars, that normally they 
do not have high levels of education and that they don't know about Mexican law"”.  
(Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2006).  
It appeared that migrants were easily recognizable with their clothes and foreign cars. A 
lot of migrants ended up paying the requested bribes to avoid wasting time or having 
their cars confiscated (Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2006)8. The Paisano 
(compatriot) program in Mexico, one of the state policies towards migrants, has aimed 
at the very purpose of easing the return of migrants for vacations by eliminating police’s 
bribe extortions (Fitzgerald, 2006, p.278).  
My argument here is that remittance may make recipients more likely to be 
asked for bribes by, among others, public officials, hence higher propensity to pay 
bribes. It seems contradictory to the argument above that positive social remittances 
                                                             
8 Jennifer Delson, Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2006, “A road paved with extortion”. Available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/dec/03/local/me-bribe3  
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may result in fewer bribe payments. Does it mean that social remittances, no matter how 
beneficial they are for control of corruption, may have very little impact on reducing 
bribery because the recipients are prone to bribe extortions anyway?  
This may be the case. According to Portes (2008, p.5) on migration and social 
change, the depth of social changes can be categorized into those that lead to only 
superficial, “marginal modifications of the social order” (Portes, 2008, p.5) and those 
that shift the fundamental values shaping the society. Portes (2008, p.14) argued that 
migration can lead to deeper social changes in home countries than in destination 
countries, depending on the size of expatriate communities as a share of total 
population, migration duration and the migrants’ characteristics. In short, profound 
social changes in sending countries can only be created if the core values underpinning 
the society are changed.  
A corrupt society can be characterized with “a particularistic political culture”, 
in which the government treats its citizens and provides public services based on a 
person’s status or social position (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p.92). With status being 
understood as representing the distance between a person and the group(s) that holds 
power, individuals with closer links to such groups enjoy greater access to public 
services9 (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p.88). Those that have lower status may have to pay 
bribes to officials to obtain equal treatment (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p.88). As such, a 
person’s gain from the public sector depends on his/her connections, ability to bribe, 
and involvement in corrupt networks (Rothstein, 2011, p.238). When corruption is 
endemic, the need to behave corruptly, including paying bribes, to access public services 
is so ingrained in almost everyone’s mind that paying bribes or carrying out similarly 
corrupt acts becomes a standard procedure (Rothstein, 2011, p.233).  
When the new ideas and practices transmitted home by migrants come into 
confrontation with this particularistic culture, it may not be easy, though not totally 
impossible, for the former to transform the latter if corrupt behavior is understood as 
the prevailing behavioral expectation. The reason is that, as Mungiu-Pippidi (2013, p.10) 
suggested, in a corrupt society, a “critical mass” of pro-change citizens is needed to curb 
corruption. In this case, remittance recipients may resemble such a critical mass, but the 
size of expatriate communities as a share of total population migration (Portes, 2008, 
p.14) should be large enough for the “critical mass” to be created. Even if the group is 
large enough, coordination among such a dispersed group to achieve collective action is 
challenging (Tyburski, 2012, p.342). As a result, the new ideas and practices, though 
they may have been circulated, may not be sufficiently powerful to win over the 
particularistic culture that has shaped the way a corrupt society functions. Therefore, 
behavioral change may hardly occur, i.e. migrants’ families and relatives may not refrain 
                                                             
9 As shown by Rose and Peiffer (2014) above, this does not necessarily mean that those closely linked to 
powerful groups or networks never have to pay bribes to get public services. 
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from paying bribes when they are exposed to bribe solicitation.  
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, I have reviewed and synthesized different bodies of literature in 
order to explain the relationship between remittance and petty corruption among 
remittance recipients. In short, I have argued two main points. First, monetary 
remittances facilitate the circulation of social remittances favorable for anticorruption 
from countries with higher institutional quality than migrants’ home countries, which in 
turn may reduce the recipients’ propensity to justify bribe payment. The result is that 
remittance recipients may become less likely to pay bribes. Second, compared to those 
not receiving remittance, recipients may be exposed to a higher probability of being 
targeted for bribes and therefore more prone to pay bribes, as the positive social 
remittances may not be robust enough to replace the particularistic culture of corrupt 
societies. Based on the discussion above, four testable propositions are put forward: 
Hypothesis 1: Remittance recipients are less likely to justify bribery-related 
behavior than those who do not receive remittances. 
Hypothesis 2: Remittance recipients are more likely to be asked for bribes than 
those who do not receive remittances. 
Hypothesis 3a: Remittance recipients are less likely to pay bribes than non-
recipients. 
Hypothesis 3b: Remittance recipients are more likely to pay bribes than non-
recipients. 
IV. Data and methodology 
1. Empirical milieu 
This research focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region 
(excluding North America), where migration, remittance and corruption have been 
prominent features of people’s life.  
Since the 1960s, outward migration has been a dominating trend in LAC region. 
According to UN-DESA and OECD (2013), nearly 6% of all people born in LAC region 
were living in OECD countries in 2010-2011. In the same period, the emigration rate for 
LAC region was almost seven times the rate for Asia and more than twice that for Africa 
(UN-DESA and OECD, 2013). Three most popular destinations for migrants from LAC 
countries have been developed countries including the United States, Spain and Canada, 
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with each country accounting for, respectively, 72%, 9% and 2% of the total migrants 
from the region in 2010 (Organization of American States, 2011, p.57). Despite the 
economic slowdown in the United States and Spain during 2008-2009, remittances to 
Mexico and Central America were still dominated by remittance flows from the US, while 
remittances to Southern America came mostly from the US and Spain (Orozco et al, 
2016, p.6, p.14). Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing trend of intra-regional 
mobility, which accounted for 11% of total LAC migration in 2010 (Organization of 
American States, 2011, p.57). Several countries in the region, such as Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Venezuela and Chile, have constantly received migrants from neighboring 
countries (Organization of American States, 2011, p.62). Although remittances received 
along these intra-regional corridors were smaller than those from the US and Spain, 
remittance flows among several pairs of neighboring countries did increase. For 
instance, remittances from Chile, Panama and Ecuador to Colombia increased by 14.3%, 
35.3% and 71.6%, correspondingly, from 2014 to 2015 (Orozco et al, 2016, p.14).   
 
Source: Organization of American States. “International Migration in the Americas: First Report of the 
Continuous Reporting System on International Migration in the Americas” (SICREMI) 2011, p.57. 
 
Remittances have become very important for many Latin American countries. In 
2014, Latin America and the Caribbean received more than US$63 billion of remittances, 
which was nearly 40% of foreign direct investment and more than six times as large as 
official development assistance flows to the region10 (World Development Indicators, 
2015). For many countries in the region like Haiti, Honduras and El Salvador, remittance 
makes up more than 15% of GDP (Maldonado and Hayem, 2015, p.29). At household 
                                                             
10 Author’s calculation based on data from World Development Indicators 2015, section 6.9, 6.11 and 6.13.  
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levels, remittances accounted for a substantial proportion of total household income, 
ranging from 18% in Ecuador to 43% in Brazil (de Haas, 2007, p.8). There is evidence 
that remittances have contributed positively to socio-economic development in the 
region, such as poverty and inequality reduction in recipient countries, increase in 
households’ savings and spending on human capital (Fainzylber and Lopez, 2008).  
On the other hand, corruption is rampant in this region. More than two thirds of 
the countries in the Latin America and Carribean region fall in the bottom half of the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2014 (i.e. score under 50/100). Grand corruption has 
been a major problem in the region. One of the latest scandals is the case of Brazil’s state 
oil giant, Petrobras. More than 50 incumbent politicians and 18 companies were 
involved in siphoning more than US$2 billion from the company into parties and private 
hands. It is one of the three grand corruption scandals in the region (among nine 
worldwide) that the Transparency International decided to pursue social sanctions in 
their campaign “Unmask the corrupt 2015”11. Bribery is rather common as well. 
According to the survey data from the AmericasBarometer 2014 which covers 26 
countries12 with more than 46,000 respondents in the studied region, roughly one in five 
respondents paid a bribe in the year prior to the survey (Zechmeister, 2014, p.140). 
2. Data 
This study relies on survey data from the AmericasBarometer by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The AmericasBarometer is a series of multi-
country surveys regularly conducted in North America and the Caribbean, focusing on 
socio-economic conditions, values, and behaviors in the Americas. It contains questions 
on migration, remittance and corruption, as well as other socio-demographic indicators, 
all of which are not always available in other multi-national surveys (Global Corruption 
Barometer, Eurobarometer, Afrobarometer, etc.) (Rose and Peiffer, 2013, p.13). The 
survey has been conducted every two years since 2004, with the number of 
participating countries increasing through each wave. In each country, approximately 
1500 people were interviewed face-to-face (except internet surveys in Canada and the 
US, which are not part of this study) in each wave. Only one respondent was interviewed 
per household. The questions were translated into popular indigenous languages in the 
region. The samples of respondents were designed to be nationally representative and 
followed a stratified multi-stage cluster sampling13.  
This research builds on data from 16 countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
                                                             
11 See details at: 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_to_pursue_social_sanction
s_on_9_grand_corruption  
12 This figure excludes Canada and the United States. 
13 For more details on the methodology of the AmericasBarometer, see: 
http://vanderbilt.edu/lapop/methods-practices.php  
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Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Belize), surveyed in the latest wave, 2014. This is 
the wave that has the largest coverage of countries and contains several updates 
regarding data collection technique (using handheld electronic devices) and sampling 
frame so that it reflects the population changes (if any) captured in the new 2010-2011 
national census.  
The countries were selected upon several considerations of methodological and 
practical character. This set of countries provides a good coverage of geographical sub-
regions (Central America, Andean/Southern Cone and the Caribbean), income groups 
(ranging from low to high income) and remittance figures as well as corruption level. In 
2014, the total annual remittances these 16 countries received accounted for 89% of the 
total remittance flows to the whole LAC region14 (Orozco et al, 2016, p.4). Within the set, 
Haiti has the highest remittance proportion in GDP (22.7% in 2014) (World Bank) and is 
also the most corrupt country (CPI score 19/100, 2014). I used data and questionnaire 
from the merged dataset for the period 2004-2014 on the AmericasBarometer website 
because they have been integrated and officially translated into English15. In the merged 
dataset, LAPOP reweighs are assigned in such a way that each country renders a sample 
size of 1,500. As weighted samples require special statistical programs that are designed 
to take into account complex sampling strategy (to which I have no access), I selected 
only those countries whose samples are not seriously affected if they are unweighted, i.e. 
the national sample size is close to 1,500 respondents16. The resulting dataset consists of 
24,304 observations in 16 countries taken in 2014.  
Due to the construction of one of the dependent variables (“paid bribe”), which 
is described in the following part, I further excluded 3,155 cases from this sample. This 
action facilitates the interpretation of results (see more details below), but comes as a 
cost of reduced sample size. The sample size of each country consequently ranges from 
1,248 to 1,403 respondents, instead of 1,500 cases. The final dataset used for analysis 
includes 21,149 observations in 16 countries in 2014. 
Details on the countries included in the analysis are provided in Annex 1. 
3. Variables 
                                                             
14 This figure excludes Bahamas and Barbados. 
15 Some national questionnaires in 2014 are only available in Spanish, such as Ecuador and Venezuela. I 
exclude these countries to avoid the possibility that unofficial translation affects the sensitivity of 
outcomes to how the questions are formulated. 
16 The countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region that were surveyed in 2014, but excluded from 
this thesis are: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela. These countries have rather similar characteristics to those selected, in terms of 
geographical location, income groups, remittance figures and corruption level. Thus, the exclusion of these 
countries does not seriously affect the results of analysis. 
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3.1. Dependent variables 
The main interest of this thesis is to examine whether remittances influence the 
recipient’s tendency to pay bribe. Therefore, the main dependent variable is a binary 
variable called “paid bribe”, which measures whether the respondent did pay a bribe 
within the last twelve months or not. I relied on a number of questions in which 
respondents were asked if they had contacted and used any public services (obtaining 
official documents, the courts, hospital, children’s education, work-related matters) in 
the last twelve months. If yes, they were then asked if they had to pay a bribe to the 
corresponding institution. Because the focus of this study is on the likelihood of paying 
bribe when an individual contacted the public service suppliers, I excluded from the 
sample those respondents that did not contact any of the mentioned public services in 
the last twelve months (3155 respondents). I then constructed a categorical variable 
which consists of two categories: 0 = people who were in contact with at least one of 
those institutions but did not pay a bribe; and 1 = people who bribed at least one of the 
public service providers. 
I also created two other dependent variables to test Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2. First, I constructed a binary variable to measure individual attitude 
towards bribery, called “justify paying a bribe”, based on the question “Do you think 
given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?”17. Second, I created a 
dichotomous variable named “being asked for bribe”, using information from the 
questions regarding whether the respondent was asked for a bribe by a police officer, a 
government employee or a soldier/military officer in the last twelve months. With these 
two variables, an affirmative answer does not necessarily mean that a person did pay a 
bribe. Therefore, the information gained from these two variables is supposed to 
complement that from the main dependent variable “paid bribe”, which is the focus of 
this study. That said, if there is information about whether a person justified paying a 
bribe and whether he/she was asked for bribes, but no information about whether 
he/she did pay a bribe, it would be impossible to draw any conclusions about the 
relationship between remittance and the propensity to pay bribes. As a result, it makes 
sense to exclude 3,155 (whole) cases, i.e. excluding data on all variables of these cases, 
rather than only 3,155 missing values of the “paid bribe” variable.  
3.2. Independent variable 
The main independent variable is a dichotomous variable named “remittance”, 
based on the question “Do you or someone else living in your household receive 
remittances (financial support), that is, economic assistance from abroad?”, 0 = No, 1 = 
                                                             
17 As Tavits (2005) suggested that there is a relationship between a person’s attitude towards bribery and 
his/her actual bribe payment, adding both of them in regressions with the remittance variable may trigger 
multicollinearity. Thus, it appears better to treat them as separate dependent variables. 
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Yes. This variable was also used in Ivlevs and King (2014). While using such a binary 
variable allows comparison between two groups of individuals (recipients versus non-
recipients) regarding their corruption experiences, it may not always provide sufficient 
information to explain the mechanism behind the differences (if any) between the two 
groups. Specifically, to test Hypothesis 1 and 3a related to the transmission of social 
remittances together with monetary remittances, it would be beneficial to have 
additional independent variables. For instance, the frequency of communication 
between remittance senders and recipients and/or of receiving remittances, the degree 
of dependence of the household on remittances may affect the magnitude of the social 
remittance impact (Levitt, 1998, p.940-941). Nonetheless, these questions were not 
asked in the AmericasBarometer 2014.  
3.3. Control variables 
Following previous research, I controlled for a number of variables18. I first took 
into account the household income level (Mocan, 2004; Guerrero and Rodriguez-
Oreggia, 2008). The original monthly household income variable has 16 categories. To 
make it easier to interpret the meaning of the coefficient, I collapsed these categories 
into three levels: 1 = low, 2 = middle, 3 = high. 
I also controlled for perception of the spread of corruption (Tavits, 2005), based 
on the question “Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, 
corruption among public officials is: (1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or 
(4) Very uncommon?”. I reversed the scale of this variable so that the higher the value, 
the more common the respondent perceives corruption to be. 
To account for whether the respondent belongs to political/social networks, I 
constructed two binary variables called “political networks” and “social networks” (Rose 
and Peiffer, 2013, 2014) (0 = No; 1 = Yes). The variable regarding political networks was 
based on information from four questions on whether the respondent requested help 
from a public official in municipality or local government, whether he/she attended the 
town or city council meetings in the last twelve months, and how often he/she attended 
meetings of a political party or political organization. The other variable regarding social 
networks was created based on the questions related to the respondent’s participation 
in solving a problem in the community, frequency of attendance at meetings of different 
associations (religious, parent, community improvement committee). 
I accounted for other individual and household characteristics that were 
included in studies on individual determinants of corruption. These variables include 
                                                             
18 To make sure the results of regressions with different dependent variables are comparable with one 
another, I included the same set of control variables in all the regressions (though the theoretical 
explanations for the relationship between each control variable and each of the dependent variables are 
not always available). 
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gender (0 = male, 1 = female) (Swamy et al, 2001; Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 
2008; Mocan, 2004; Zechmeister, 2014), age – over 60 years old or not (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 
(Mocan, 2004), education level (0 = no education, 1 = primary, 2 = secondary, 3 = 
tertiary and above) (Rose and Peiffer, 2014; Mocan, 2014; Guerrero and Rodriguez-
Oreggia, 2008; Zechmeister, 2014).  
As the “paid bribe” variable was constructed based on, among others, the 
question on whether a person paid bribes for work-related matters, I controlled for 
employment status, i.e. whether a person has a (paid) job or not (0 = No, 1 = Yes). All 
else being equal, those that have a paid job are more likely to interact with government 
officers regarding work-related matters, be asked for bribe and have financial ability to 
pay bribes than unemployed people.  
Last but not least, I took into account whether anyone in the household is a 
beneficiary of government assistance programs or not (0 = No, 1 = Yes). Zechmeister’s 
report on corruption in Latin America using AmericasBarometer data 2014 showed that 
those that received welfare from the state faced higher possibility to be targeted for 
extortion due to their interaction with the government, compared to non-beneficiaries 
(Zechmeister, 2014, p.147).  
4. Methodology: Multilevel modeling 
This study employs the large-N statistical method with multilevel modeling on 
SPSS statistical software (version 23). Normally, with categorical outcomes and data at 
only one level (for example, individuals, or households, or countries), single-level 
logistic analysis can be good enough to predict the probability (or likelihood) of an event 
occurring. However, as AmericasBarometer employed stratified multi-stage cluster 
sampling, a type of hierarchical sampling strategy, a multilevel model appears to be a 
better choice. Hierarchical sampling means that clusters (or groups) are sampled at 
higher level, and then individuals are sampled within clusters (groups) at lower level 
(Hox, 2002, p.1). The problem with a single-level model incorporating variables at 
different levels/clusters is that it violates the assumption of independence of 
observations, which standard statistical tests rely on (Hox, 2002, p.5). It means that, for 
instance, individuals clustered in one group may be more similar to one another 
compared to individuals in another group. The consequence is that the estimate of 
standard errors becomes too small and the results appear more significant than they 
should be (Hox, 2002, p.5). A multilevel model helps lower the possibility of biased 
estimation by explicitly modeling the clustering of data.  
A feature of the multilevel model is to allow for testing fixed and random effects 
at different levels. By “fixed effects”, I mean that the estimates of parameters are 
interpreted as the average across the whole sample, while “random effects” means that 
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the estimates of these parameters are interpreted as the additional change in the 
outcome caused by different groups (Heck et al, 2012, p.17). In this study, I pay attention 
to the significance of the random effects rather than their substantive meanings. 
According to Heck et al (2012), a basic two-level model is often implemented in 
a step-wise procedure. First, a so-called null model with random intercept at group level 
only (no predictors) is estimated to find out whether the outcomes vary among groups. 
Then, level-1 (for example, individual-level, household-level) predictors are added to the 
model as fixed effects (intercept is always random) to see whether individual/household 
characteristics affect the outcomes. Next, level-1 predictors are added as random effects, 
i.e. the slope of a level-1 predictor is expected to vary among groups. This means that the 
relationship between individual/household characteristics and the outcomes may vary 
across groups, or different contexts. It leads to the next step, adding level-2 predictors to 
identify if group-specific features affect the outcomes as well. Lastly, cross-level 
interaction terms can be added if certain group-level factors are expected to moderate 
the relationship between individual-level factors and the outcomes. At the end of each 
step, the variances of intercept and slope (if any) among groups are calculated. 
Significant variances at least at p<0.05 signalize the need to continue with the next step. 
The intraclass correlation (ICC) is also calculated to determine the portion of variability 
in the outcomes that can be explained by the variability between groups compared to 
the total variability (Heck et al, 2012, p.21)19. As multilevel models with categorical 
outcomes and more than two levels can be quite demanding regarding model 
estimation, researchers are advised to run these models only if there is a specific 
theoretical guidance to do so (Heck et al, 2012, p.9).  
This thesis focuses on effects at level-1 (individual/household level). 
Nonetheless, as discussed above, the literature on individual determinants of corruption 
pointed out that contextual factors affect a person’s propensity of paying bribes. Thus, I 
implemented a simple two-level model, with the minimal control at level 2 (country 
level), i.e. with random intercept. The control at level 2 of the model is supposed to cover 
all the variances caused by level-2 variables (if any) (Möhring, 2012), which are not 
examined in this thesis. Therefore, the focus of my analysis is on the two-level model 
with all level-1 predictors as fixed effects. Yet, the results of the null model and the 
model with level-1 predictor(s) as random effect(s) would also be provided to 
demonstrate the step-wise procedure.  
This two-level model with only fixed effects and robust standard errors 
                                                             
19 SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
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understood as the (approximate) variance of a logistic distribution with scale factor 1.0 (Heck et al, 2012, 
p.157). 
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produces similar results as logistic regressions with country fixed effects (i.e. country 
dummies), with the number of countries smaller than 25 and robust standard errors 
(Möhring, 2012). Another practical issue in favour of multilevel modeling is that SPSS 
requires an add-on component to estimate robust standard errors in single-level logistic 
regressions (to which I have no access), while the option of robust estimator of standard 
errors is readily integrated in multilevel modeling. The robust (Huber/White/sandwich) 
estimator of standard errors provided by SPSS is a technique that, in principle, 
exaggerates standard errors, thereby reducing the possibility of mistakenly concluding 
that the results are significant (Heck et al, 2012). However, robust standard errors may 
lead to inaccurate estimates if the number of units at level 2 is small (Heck et al, 2012, 
p.147). It remains arbitrary as to the threshold for the number of level-2 units to be 
considered “small” (Cameron and Miller, 2014, p.342). Therefore, I included results both 
with and without robust standard errors to find out if there is a large difference between 
them. 
5. Limitations of methodology 
As I explained previously, one of the advantages of the multilevel model is that it 
helps reduce biased estimation by explicitly integrating the multilevel data structure in 
the model. A multilevel model also allows for modeling fixed effects and random effects, 
and robust estimation of standard errors. However, this methodology may suffer from 
several constraints.  
First, SPSS multilevel modeling procedure has quite limited strategy to deal with 
missing data. Missing data can result in biased estimation of parameters if not handled 
in an appropriate way. There are three types of missing data mechanisms, missing 
completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR) and non-ignorable missing 
(NIM) (Heck et al, 2012, p.30). MCAR means that the data missing on the outcome is not 
related to data missing on observed variables or unobserved variables, hence no bias in 
the estimation. MAR refers to the situation where the probability of missing data on the 
outcome depends only on the probability of missing data on observed predictors. To 
illustrate, if all demographic variables (sex, age, etc.) are recorded for all respondents in 
a survey, then the data on the earning outcome is MAR if the probability of missing data 
is only related to those fully recorded variables. NIM refers to the case when the 
probability of missing values on the outcomes may be linked to the unobserved or not 
fully recorded predictors (Heck et al, 2012, p.30; Gelman and Hill, 2006, p.530). For 
instance, to the extent that earnings depend on high education, those people with high 
education tend to not reveal their earnings and there are also missing values in the 
education question. Then the earning outcome is NIM (Gelman and Hill, 2006, p.530). 
Another example is that if a treatment causes discomfort for a patient, then he/she is 
likely to drop out of the study. If “discomfort” is not measured and observed for all 
patients, the treatment outcome is NIM (Gelman and Hill, 2006, p.530). The last type of 
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missing data causes more biased estimation than the other two types (Heck et al, 2012, 
p.30). 
The dataset I used had a rather considerable amount of missing values (about 
20-30% of total sample in some models - see the next Section for empirical results and 
Annex 7 for details on missing data). To deal with missing data, the multilevel modeling 
procedure in SPSS, up to now, has only allowed for listwise deletion, i.e. any case with at 
least one missing value on any variable will be eliminated (Heck et al, 2012, p.30). 
Listwise deletion is only accepted when data is missing completely at random (MCAR), 
which is a very strong assumption and is hardly the case with real data (Heck et al, 2012, 
p.30). In addition, it leads to substantial loss of information. A recommended procedure 
to deal with missing data starts with determining the pattern of missing data by 
conducting necessary tests. However, SPSS does not provide test for missing data 
patterns of categorical variables. Therefore, in this study, it seems reasonable to assume 
that MCAR is not the case. Then an acceptable solution is to create multiple imputations 
to replace missing values with imputed plausible values and analyze based on these 
imputed datasets (Heck et al, 2012, p.31). Results from the pooled dataset (combining all 
the imputed datasets) can be compared with results from the original dataset with 
missing data. Nevertheless, for multilevel models with categorical outcomes, SPSS does 
not produce parameter estimates for the pooled dataset. Although, in principle, these 
estimates are the average of the estimates from separate imputed datasets (Gelman and 
Hill, 2006, p.542), calculating them by hand, especially the standard errors, the 
significance levels and the variances, is rather complicated. Given these limitations, the 
only thing that could be done is to include in the model as many predictors that may 
influence the probability of missingness as possible (Gelman and Hill, 2006, p.531). In 
this case, it means including variables that were found to be related to the outcomes in 
previous literature. Gelman and Hill (2006, p.531) argue that doing so makes sure that 
the assumption of MAR is reasonable, and then it is acceptable to exclude the missing 
cases providing that the above-mentioned variables have been controlled for. Above all, 
I acknowledge that the problem of missing data has not been completely solved due to 
technical constraints, thus the results should be considered with caution. 
Second, this multilevel model is a cross-sectional analysis in its nature and, 
therefore, the results may be insufficient to make sound conclusions about causation 
due to the endogeneity problem. The potential causes of this problem include self-
selection into remittance recipients and reverse causality from corruption to migration-
remittance (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007, p.4).  
In randomized experiments, the randomization creates two groups that are 
basically the same. The difference in outcomes between the treatment and the control 
groups, therefore, can be attributed to the treatment (Hill, 2004). Self-selection issue 
means that whether a study unit falls into the treatment or the control group may not be 
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a function of randomization, but there are systematic pre-treatment differences between 
the two groups that lead to their choice of treatment (Hill, 2004). In the example of 
remittance, remittances receivers and non-receivers may be systematically different 
regarding certain characteristics, which influence their probability of receiving the 
treatment (receiving remittances). These characteristics can be either observable (e.g. 
level of income of both remittance senders and receivers, etc.) or unobservable (e.g. 
senders’ ability, etc.) (Acosta, 2006, p.18-21). In this case, the receipt of remittance may 
not be the only difference between the control and the treatment groups. An omitted 
variable problem, i.e. an unobservable factor drives both the independent variable and 
the dependent variable, may also be present (Acosta, 2006, p.3). Consequently, it is 
difficult to attribute the difference in bribery-related outcomes to the receipt of 
remittance, which is the main goal of this research.  
A technique often used to correct for this self-selection problem is Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM). According to Thoemmes (2012), PSM helps balance the 
systematic differences between the treatment group (remittance recipients) and the 
control group (non-recipients). A propensity score, i.e. the probability of receiving the 
treatment, is calculated based on a number of observable characteristics. A person from 
the treatment group can be matched with a person from the control group with a similar 
estimated propensity score. The average treatment effect is finally calculated based on 
the matched sample. Yet, this technique requires the use of pre-treatment covariates, 
which are not always available in the AmericasBarometers questionnaire. To illustrate, 
one of the covariates that should be included in calculating the propensity score of 
receiving remittance is household income. But the survey does not have any information 
on whether this income excludes remittance or not. Furthermore, PSM cannot account 
for unobservable characteristics. Thus, the problem of self-selection cannot be solved 
completely with PSM. 
Nevertheless, it seems unclear that the self-selection issue is problematic for the 
identification of impact in this research. As I have added common control variables at 
individual and household levels, the probability that any other observable characteristic 
can affect the outcomes is relatively low. It is possible that unobservable characteristic 
matters, but it is difficult to come up with such a factor that affects both the likelihood of 
receiving remittance and adopting corruption-related attitude or engaging in 
corruption. Therefore, although I acknowledge that this problem may exist, it seems 
either unnecessary or infeasible to totally correct for it. 
Reverse causality means that the outcome may affect the predictor, not the 
other way round (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007, p.4). Studies on migration/remittance and 
corruption have often accounted for the possibility that migrants take into consideration 
the level of corruption when deciding to migrate and/or sending remittance back home 
(Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Abdih et al, 2012; Tyburski, 2014; Ivlevs and King, 2014). A 
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solution for the reverse causality is to use panel data (Acosta, 2006), yet it is impossible 
in this case because large-scale surveys like the AmericasBarometer do not follow the 
same households in every wave. Another solution is to use an instrumental variable 
which must be relevant, i.e. highly correlated with the migration/remittance variable, 
and exogenous, i.e. not directly affect the corruption variable (Ivlevs and King, 2014, 
p.13). Various instruments for migration and remittance have been used in previous 
studies, for example, migration network or history (at household, village or municipality 
level) (Acosta, 2006; Ivlevs and King, 2014), economic shocks (Yang, 2006), the coastal 
area of a country (Tyburski, 2014), and so on. To decide if the instrument is both 
relevant and exogenous, researchers must carry out a number of tests, which are 
available in several statistical programs. SPSS is not a good option for handling 
instruments for categorical variables, for example, it does not provide the tests for the 
instrument. I therefore did not conduct instrumental variable analysis.  
However, it is not clear that reverse causality is a serious problem for this 
research. Previous research focused on the relationship between remittance and the 
aggregate level of corruption. In that case, it makes sense to discuss the possibility that 
migrants consider the corruption level when deciding to remit. But this thesis focuses on 
the relationship between remittance and receivers’ attitude and behaviour related to 
corruption. It is hard, though not totally impossible, to come up with a persuasive 
empirical situation in which an individual’s attitude towards bribery (that bribery is 
justifiable), the likelihood of being solicited for bribes and their decision to pay bribes 
may influence the probability of their household receiving remittance. Having said that, I 
acknowledge that this problem may be present and suggest it be dealt with in future 
research. 
V. Results 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part provides results of 
multilevel analysis with robust estimation of standard errors (and missing values). 
These results are compared with those of analysis without robust standard errors, 
which are presented in Annex 5. The second part focuses on diagnostic checks to see if 
the analysis in the first part violated any assumptions of multilevel modeling with 
categorical outcomes.  
1. Results with robust estimation of standard errors 
Results in this part are presented in the order of the hypotheses which were 
tested, table 1 for hypothesis 1, table 2 for hypothesis 2, and table 3 for both hypotheses 
3a and 3b. In each table, three models are presented. The first model in every table is the 
null model, the second model with all predictors as fixed effects, and the last model with 
receiving remittances as a random effect and other predictors as fixed effects. Random 
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intercept was included in all models. Both (unstandardized) coefficients and odds ratios 
are reported. Odds ratio is often used to facilitate interpretation of the results. It denotes 
the change in the odds of the outcome event occurring versus not occurring per unit 
change of the predictor. Odds ratios larger than 1 mean positive relationships, while 
those smaller than 1 represent negative relationships. If odds ratios are equal to 1, it 
means there is no relationship between the variables. For predictors that have at least 
two categories, the first category is used as reference category, i.e. the odds ratio of each 
of the remaining categories is interpreted in comparison with the first category.  
Table 1 below presents the results of whether receiving remittances affects the 
recipients’ propensity of justifying paying bribes as per hypothesis 1. Table 1, Model 1 
(null model) indicates that countries vary regarding their starting points in the level of 
remittance recipients’ attitude towards bribery, the variance of the country intercepts 
being significant at p<0.05. ICC is 0.099, which means that 9.9% of the total variance can 
be explained by the variance between countries, and 90.1% explained by the variance 
among individuals/households within countries. The null model results confirm the 
need to proceed with Model 2 with all level-1 variables as fixed effects. My main 
independent variable, receiving remittances, is found to have a strongly significant and 
positive relationship with the recipients’ tendency of justifying paying bribes (p<0.001). 
This is contrary to what hypothesis 1 predicted. The odds ratio of the independent 
variable is 1.201, which means that, all else being equal, those receiving remittances are 
1.2 times more likely to think that paying bribes is justifiable than those without 
remittances. The variance of intercepts at country level remains significant at p<0.05 
and ICC is 0.103, which is slightly higher than that in Model 1. These results do not 
change in Model 3, in which receiving remittances is added as a random effect. Yet, the 
variance of the remittance variable becomes 0 in Model 3, which can be interpreted that 
the clustering of individuals within countries does not help explain the variance in the 
relationship between remittance receipt and the likelihood of being asked for bribes 
(Cornell University, 2012). For this reason, it appears unnecessary to proceed to 
subsequent models in the stepwise procedure. 
Among control variables, only gender, age over 60 and being a beneficiary of 
government support program have significant relationship with the propensity of 
justifying bribery. Women and people over 60 years old are less likely to find paying 
bribes justifiable than men and younger people, respectively. On the contrary, those who 
received support from government programs tend to justify bribery, which implies that 
bribery may be part of the process of obtaining welfare in the Americas (Zechmeister, 
2014, p.147). Compared with those who perceive corruption to be very uncommon, 
those that perceive corruption to be very common are significantly more likely to justify 
paying bribes. Most of the remaining control variables have positive relationships with 
the outcome (except for the primary education level and social networks); however, 
their coefficients are not significant at all. 
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Table 1 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of justifying 
paying bribes 
Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances 
  0.183*** 1.201   
  (0.052)    
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  0.071 1.074 0.071 1.074 
  (0.077)  (0.077)  
High 
  0.138 1.148 0.138 1.148 
  (0.099)  (0.099)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  0.223 1.249 0.223 1.249 
  (0.146)  (0.146)  
Common 
  0.186 1.205 0.186 1.205 
  (0.152)  (0.152)  
Very common 
  0.418** 1.519 0.418** 1.519 
  (0.158)  (0.158)  
Political 
networks 
  0.102 1.108 0.102 1.108 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  
Social networks 
  -0.033 0.967 -0.033 0.967 
  (0.100)  (0.100)  
Gender 
  -0.316*** 0.729 -0.316*** 0.729 
  (0.070)  (0.070)  
Age over 60 
  -0.433** 0.648 -0.433** 0.648 
  (0.127)  (0.127)  
Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
Primary 
  -0.087 0.917 -0.087 0.917 
  (0.134)  (0.134)  
Secondary 
  0.221 1.248 0.221 1.248 
  (0.147)  (0.147)  
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Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Tertiary 
  0.205 1.228 0.205 1.228 
  (0.125)  (0.125)  
Employment 
status 
  0.011 1.011 0.011 1.011 
  (0.065)  (0.065)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.209** 1.232 0.209** 1.232 
 
 
(0.069)  (0.069)  
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-1.512*** 0.220 -1.888*** 0.151 -1.888*** 0.151 
(0.157) 
 
(0.283)  (0.283)  
Receiving 
remittances 
    0.183*** 1.201 
    (0.052)  
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.364*  0.379*  0.379*  
(0.145)  (0.152)  (0.152)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0a  
      
ICCb 0.099  0.103  0.103  
Akaike 
Correctedc 
87058.002  71333.498  71335.498  
N (level 1) 18108  14695  14695  
N (level 2) 16  16  16  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS automatically set this parameter as redundant. 
b – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
c – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
 
Table 2 tests whether remittance receipt affects the recipients’ propensity of 
being asked for bribes as hypothesis 2 suggested. Again, Model 4 (null model) 
demonstrates that there are statistically significant differences among countries as for 
their starting points in the level of bribe solicitations, the variance of the country 
intercepts being significant at p<0.01 and 8.3% of the total variance can be explained by 
the variance between countries (ICC = 0.083). In line with hypothesis 2, Model 5 with all 
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predictors as fixed effects shows that the main independent variable, receiving 
remittances, is a strongly significant predictor of the recipients’ likelihood of being 
asked for bribes (p<0.001). The odds ratio of the independent variable is 1.406, which 
means that, holding other variables constant, remittance recipients are 1.4 times more 
likely to be solicited for bribes by public officials than non-recipients. The sign of this 
relationship remains the same, but the size of effect slightly increases in Model 6 where 
remittance variable is included as a random effect. The variance at country level remains 
significant in both Model 5 and Model 6, but at lower level of significance (p<0.05) than 
in Model 4. The variance of the remittance variable is not significant at all in Model 6. ICC 
is 0.081 and 0.074 in Model 5 and Model 6, respectively, which is lower than that in 
Model 4. These figures point out the decreasing role of the between-country variance in 
explaining the variance in the relationship between remittance receipt and the 
likelihood of bribe extortion. Thus, there is no need to build subsequent models.  
Regarding control variables, those that have political/social networks and at 
least secondary education are more prone to bribe solicitations than those without any 
networks or education. Compared to those that perceive corruption to be very 
uncommon, those that perceive corruption to be uncommon (i.e. slightly more popular) 
are less likely to be asked for bribes. These controls have no significant relationship with 
the tendency of justifying bribe payment, but are found to be significantly associated to 
the likelihood of being asked for bribes. On the contrary, whether a person is a 
beneficiary of government support programs is a significant predictor of increased 
probability of justifying bribery, but not bribe extortions. On the other hand, several 
controls have the same relationship with both dependent variables in Table 1 and Table 
2. Gender and age over 60 are significantly related to lower likelihood of being asked for 
bribes. Women and people over 60 years old, as predicted, are less likely to be targeted 
for bribes probably due to more limited interaction with government officials compared 
to men and younger people. Employment status and household monthly income have 
positive relationships with the likelihood of being asked for bribes, but their coefficients 
are not significant, except for the coefficient of high income level (significant at p<0.05).  
Table 2 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of being asked 
for bribes 
Model 
(4) (5) (6) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances 
  0.341*** 1.406   
  (0.083)    
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Model 
(4) (5) (6) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  0.018 1.018 0.021 1.021 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  
High 
  0.199* 1.220 0.202* 1.223 
  (0.097)  (0.095)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  -0.260** 0.771 -0.240** 0.787 
  (0.090)  (0.082)  
Common 
  -0.261 0.770 -0.257 0.773 
  (0.146)  (0.147)  
Very common 
  0.116 1.123 0.123 1.131 
  (0.128)  (0.128)  
Political 
networks 
  0.449*** 1.566 0.449*** 1.567 
  (0.084)  (0.083)  
Social networks 
  0.246* 1.279 0.242* 1.274 
  (0.117)  (0.115)  
Gender 
  -0.710*** 0.491 -0.711*** 0.491 
  (0.085)  (0.086)  
Age over 60 
  -0.565*** 0.569 -0.566*** 0.568 
  (0.078)  (0.079)  
Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
Primary 
  0.118 1.128 0.120 1.127 
  (0.115)  (0.127)  
Secondary 
  0.558*** 1.746 0.555*** 1.742 
  (0.112)  (0.113)  
Tertiary 
  0.864*** 2.373 0.856*** 2.354 
  (0.141)  (0.145)  
Employment   0.094 1.099 0.097 1.101 
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Model 
(4) (5) (6) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
status   (0.054)  (0.055)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.224 1.251 0.227 1.254 
 
 
(0.119)  (0.118) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-1.861*** 0.156 -2.509*** 0.081 -2.500*** 0.082 
(0.134) 
 
(0.206)  (0.204) 
 
Receiving 
remittances 
    0.359*** 1.431 
    (0.102)  
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.299**  0.292*  0.263*  
(0.112)  (0.115)  (0.116)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.044  
    (0.035)  
ICCa 0.083  0.081  0.074  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
105909.638  81537.657  81532.442  
N (level 1) 21119  16011  16011  
N (level 2) 16  16  16  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
 
Table 3 tests whether remittance receipt is related to the recipients’ propensity 
of pay bribes as per hypotheses 3a and 3b. Model 7 (null model) again suggests that 
countries have significantly different starting points in the level of bribe payment, with 
the variance of the country intercepts being significant at p<0.01 and ICC = 0.262. Model 
8 with all predictors as fixed effects provides support for hypothesis 3b. Remittance 
receipt is positively associated to the recipients’ likelihood of pay bribes, but at a lower 
level of significance (p<0.05) than it is to the other two dependent variables. With the 
odds ratio being 1.263, remittance recipients are 1.263 times more likely to pay bribes 
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than non-recipients, all else being equal. This relationship remains positive in Model 9 
where remittance variable is included as a random effect; nonetheless, its coefficient 
increases and becomes insignificant. The variance of country intercepts continues to be 
significant in both Model 8 and Model 9, but at lower level of significance (p<0.05) in 
Model 9. ICC increases from 0.262 in Model 7 to 0.293 in Model 8, and then decreases 
slightly to 0.291 in Model 9. However, similar to the analysis of Table 1 and Table 2, the 
variance of the remittance variable is not significant at all in Model 9; hence, no further 
model constructed.  
In terms of control variables, only political and social networks and 
employment status are significantly and positively related to the probability to pay 
bribes at high level of significance (p<0.001). It means that those that have 
political/social networks and a paid job are more likely to pay bribes than those without 
any networks or employment. Compared to those that perceive corruption to be very 
uncommon, those that perceive corruption to be uncommon (i.e. slightly more popular) 
are less likely to pay bribes. Gender has a negative relationship with the propensity to 
pay bribes, but significant at a lower level (p<0.05) than it was with the other two 
dependent variables. Education level, household monthly income level and being older 
than 60 are negatively associated to the probability of paying bribes, yet no significant 
impacts. Similar to the relationship with the likelihood of being asked for bribes, 
receiving support from government programs increases the probability of paying bribes, 
but the effects are insignificant. 
Table 3 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of paying 
bribes 
Model 
(7) (8) (9) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances 
  0.234* 1.263   
  (0.116)    
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  -0.070 0.933 -0.068 0.934 
  (0.077)  (0.077)  
High 
  -0.125 0.882 -0.116 0.890 
  (0.084)  (0.080)  
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Model 
(7) (8) (9) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  -0.212* 0.809 -0.194 0.823 
  (0.103)  (0.106)  
Common 
  -0.266 0.767 -0.255 0.775 
  (0.198)  (0.204)  
Very common 
  0.064 1.066 0.084 1.087 
  (0.178)  (0.183)  
Political 
networks 
  0.566*** 1.762 0.563*** 1.756 
  (0.089)  (0.087)  
Social networks 
  0.398*** 1.489 0.390*** 1.478 
  (0.088)  (0.084)  
Gender 
  -0.146* 0.864 -0.148* 0.863 
  (0.058)  (0.058)  
Age over 60 
  -0.175 0.839 -0.178 0.837 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  
Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
Primary 
  -0.135 0.874 -0.138 0.871 
  (0.152)  (0.154)  
Secondary 
  -0.111 0.895 -0.112 0.894 
  (0.119)  (0.121)  
Tertiary 
  -0.096 0.908 -0.114 0.892 
  (0.103)  (0.106)  
Employment 
status 
  0.199*** 1.221 0.198*** 1.219 
  (0.046)  (0.047)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.113 1.120 0.107 1.113 
 
 
(0.127)  (0.125) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-2.150*** 0.117 -2.549*** 0.078 -2.543*** 0.079 
(0.263) 
 
(0.408)  (0.409) 
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Model 
(7) (8) (9) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Receiving 
remittances 
    0.273 1.314 
    (0.141)  
Variance 
(intercept) 
1.174**  1.364**  1.352*  
(0.432)  (0.521)  (0.538)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.102  
    (0.060)  
ICCa 0.262  0.293  0.291  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
113604.845  87700.589  87678.333  
N (level 1) 21148  16028  16028  
N (level 2) 16  16  16  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
  
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
 
How well a model fits the data can be assessed with the Akaike Corrected (AC) 
values. It can be seen from the tables above that with the inclusion of fixed effects and 
random effects, AC values became smaller, which means that model fit improved a lot 
compared to the null model. Meanwhile, there is not a big difference regarding model fit 
between models with only fixed effects and models with remittance variable as a 
random effect. 
Overall, I found support for hypotheses 2 and 3b, while hypotheses 1 and 3a 
were not supported in the data. Remittance receipt was found to be a significant 
predictor of all three dependent variables. Yet, it appeared to be more strongly related 
with a recipient’s propensity of increasingly justifying paying bribes, or being asked for 
bribes by public officials, than with his/her tendency to pay more bribes. The strongest 
association was found with the likelihood of being solicited for bribes. The results 
without robust standard errors (see Annex 5) are quite similar to those presented in this 
part, except for the estimates of standard errors and minor changes in significance level 
of the coefficients of the remittance variable. As expected, in models with only fixed 
effects (Annex 5 – Models 11, 14, 17), the relationship between remittance receipt and 
the three dependent variables were found to be significant at higher level (at least 
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p<0.01) than in the analysis with robust standard errors (in which the lowest 
significance level was p<0.05). Up to this point, remittance is a major predictor of 
bribery-related attitude and behavior. 
2. Diagnostics 
The assumptions for single-level models apply for multilevel models as well 
(Heck et al, 2012, p.80). As this is a multilevel logistic model, I check if the assumptions 
for logistic regressions are violated. The assumptions include linearity, normality, 
homoscedasticity, independence of errors, no multicollinearity and outliers (Field, 2014, 
p.768). As all predictors are categorical, it is not possible to check if the predictors have 
linear relationships with the log of outcome variable (Field, 2014, p.794).  
Models with categorical dependent variable violate the assumption that 
residuals (errors) in predicting Y (the outcome) from X (the predictor) are normally 
distributed around a mean of 0. When the outcomes are dichotomous as the case in this 
thesis, Y can only have two possible values; thus, the residuals will vary according to the 
levels of X. For each level of X (predictor), there are only two possible residuals; 
therefore, residuals are not normally distributed around the mean (Heck et al, 2012, 
p.88). However, the generalized linear technique used for multilevel modeling here 
solves this problem by incorporating necessary transformation of the outcome and an 
appropriate error distribution directly into the statistical model (Hox, 2002). 
Homoscedasticity and the independence of errors are not possible to diagnose 
in SPSS component on multilevel modeling. Yet, as explained above, the multilevel model 
is supposed to correct for the problem of dependence of errors. Heteroscedasticity 
means that the residuals follow some patterns instead having constant variance from 
the mean of 0. Heteroscedasticity does not make the estimates become biased, but less 
efficient. Nonetheless, heteroscedasticity should be taken care of when robust standard 
errors are used (Williams, 2015). 
Multicollinearity happens when predictors are highly correlated with each 
other, making it difficult to distinguish the effect of each predictor on the outcome (Field, 
2014, p.325). Multicolinearity in a logistic model is checked by rerunning the analysis as 
a linear regression, including collinearity statistics (Field, 2014, p.795). VIF over 10 and 
Tolerance values under 0.1 signify the presence of multicollinearity (Field, 2014, p.795). 
The statistics in Annex 4 shows that this is not a problem in my models.  
Potential outliers can also be problematic. While individuals deviating 
substantially from their country means should not be a problem, given the large group 
sizes, individual countries deviating largely from the total sample mean could be an 
issue. As SPSS does not provide any options of producing graphs with saved values to 
identify potential outliers in multilevel models, I used simple scatterplots to identify 
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countries with means on the main independent variable and three dependent variables 
deviating from means of the total sample (see Annex 4). Two potentially significant 
outliers were Haiti and Jamaica. Their mean values were located on the right-hand side 
in all scatterplots, far from other countries’ values. However, the location of Haiti’s 
means was more substantially different from the main trend of the data than that of 
Jamaica’s means. Therefore, I reran the analysis excluding only Haiti. The results are 
provided in Annex 6. Table 7 and Table 8 (Annex 6) demonstrate that, without Haiti, the 
relationship between remittance receipt and the propensity of justifying bribery and 
being asked for bribes remains positive and significant at highest level (p<0.001), but 
the size of effects increases compared to the results with all 16 countries (Table 1, Table 
2). Interestingly, remittance is no longer a significant predictor of whether a recipient 
pays bribe or not and the size of coefficient becomes smaller, although the sign of effect 
remains positive (Table 9, Annex 6) compared with the results in Table 3. I also 
reconstructed the scatterplot between remittance means and paid bribe means without 
Haiti in the sample (Annex 6). The regression line became downward, instead of upward 
as it was when Haiti was included. These evidences point out that the relationship 
between remittance and the likelihood of bribe payment is primarily driven by data on 
Haiti, while the relationship between remittance and the remaining outcomes is not. 
VI. Discussion 
The results of the analysis suggest that remittance recipients are substantially 
more likely to think that paying a bribe is justifiable, to be prone to bribe solicitations, 
but not significantly more likely to pay bribes than non-recipients.  
Earlier, I hypothesized that monetary remittance facilitates the dissemination of 
social remittances beneficial for control of corruption from countries with higher 
institutional quality than migrants’ home countries, thus lowers the recipients’ 
propensity to justify paying bribes and to actually pay bribes. The finding that receiving 
remittances significantly increases the likelihood of justifying paying bribes is opposite 
to my hypothesis. This result can be explained as a consequence of limited or weak 
transmission of positive social remittances. On one hand, monetary may facilitate the 
circulation of such social remittances only after the recipients’ basic needs have been 
fulfilled. Ethnographic studies on transnational money transfers have documented cases 
in which monetary remittances are sent home to fulfill the migrants’ commitments and 
obligations to their families, such as covering the costs of parents’ disease treatment, 
children’s or siblings’ education, repaying debts, etc. (Paerregaard, 2015; Carling, 2014). 
In such cases, the circulation of social remittances which are useful for curbing 
corruption may be limited. On the other hand, insofar as positive social remittances are 
transmitted from less corrupt countries to more corrupt countries, the impact of such 
social remittances on the recipients’ bribery-related attitude may have been weakened 
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by the presence of less positive social remittances from countries with low quality of 
institution. As outlined above, the main destinations of migrants from LAC and from 
which remittances are sent are the US and Spain, which have better control of 
corruption, scoring 74/100 and 60/100 in CPI 2014, respectively, than those of LAC 
countries in this study, except Uruguay, scoring 73/100 in CPI 201420. Yet, increasing 
intra-regional migration and remittance flows between neighboring countries may 
hamper the transfer of positive social remittance. Most countries within the region, 
which host part of the expatriate community from their neighbor countries, except 
Chile21 and Uruguay, have quite low quality of institution (see Annex 1). Besides, as 
indicated earlier, the expatriate community of migrants from the LAC accounted for a 
fairly small share of the total regional population (6% in 2010-2011 (UN-DESA and 
OECD, 2013)). Given the complex development of migration and remittance trend, the 
impact of positive social remittance on changing the recipients’ attitude towards bribery 
may probably become not as favorable as expected.  
The relationship between remittance and the likelihood of being asked for 
bribes turns out to be as predicted. Individuals or households who receive remittances 
are more likely to be targeted for bribes by public officials than those who do not receive 
any remittances. This result is congruent with what Ivlevs and King (2014) found in the 
six Balkan countries. In fact, the association between receipt of remittances and bribe 
solicitations is consistently the strongest (at the highest level of significance) out of the 
three outcomes in this thesis. This finding echoes the argument that corrupt behaviors 
are the prevailing behavioral expectation in a corrupt society. The new ideas and 
practices transmitted from migrants may be not sufficiently strong to win over the 
existing particularistic culture in the sending countries. 
The combination of both limited or weak transmission of positive social 
remittance and the persistence of the particularistic culture underpinning the function 
of a corrupt society may hinder any behavioral change towards less petty corruption. 
Receipt of remittance has a positive relationship with the likelihood of paying bribes. 
However, unlike Ivlevs and King’s interpretation (2014), the impact of remittance on the 
propensity to pay bribes here was found to be not significant. Yet, it does not necessarily 
mean a favorable state of affairs due to the absence of positive bribery-related 
behavioral change among the remittance recipients. This finding highlights that 
monetary remittance alone may not be the solution to corruption, and that taking into 
account the role of both monetary and social remittances, and the core values that have 
shaped the way a corrupt society functions is of critical importance in curbing 
corruption in sending countries. This point corroborates the findings of some of the 
studies at cross-national level that I referred to previously (Abdih et al, 2012; Berdiev et 
al, 2013; Ahmed, 2013) in the sense that they did not consider the role of social 
                                                             
20 0 means highly corrupt, while 100 means very clean. 
21 Chile is not included in this study. 
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remittances and found a detrimental effect of monetary remittance on institutional 
quality in home countries.  
The association of remittance and bribe payment becomes slightly stronger (at 
the lowest significance level) when the sample includes Haiti, which is identified as an 
outlier. Haiti has the highest country mean on both remittance and bribe payment (see 
Annex 4). This finding can be partially explained when we look at the country 
background (see Annex 1). Among the 16 countries in this study, Haiti is the poorest, 
most corrupt country with the highest proportion of remittance over GDP 2014. It is the 
only country in the sample classified by the World Bank as a low income country. Five 
years after it was devastated by a massive earthquake in 2010, Haiti has yet to fully 
recover (US Agency for International Development (USAID), 2015). 59% of Haitians live 
in poverty and 75% of the population live on less than US$2 per day (World Food 
Programme (WFP), 2016). Access to water, sanitation, electricity, health care and food 
security is limited (WPF, 2016). In this sending country, where the people’s basic needs 
have yet to be fulfilled, the money migrants send home may be used to serve these needs 
rather than to facilitate the dissemination of ideas and practices to fight corruption. It 
may also be the case that those receiving remittances can be more easily identified from 
other poor people. When corruption is pervasive, the remittance receivers may be 
exposed to more bribe extortions to access public services and more likely to pay bribes. 
Several control variables have performed as expected with at least one outcome, 
even when Haiti is excluded. Women and people over 60 years old are less likely to 
justify paying a bribe, be asked for bribes and pay bribes than men and younger people, 
respectively. It confirms the argument that women and aged people may be less 
frequently involved in transactions with public officials (Mocan, 2004). Employment 
status is only a strong predictor of whether an individual pays bribes, with those having 
a paid job more likely to pay bribes than those who are unemployed, probably because 
the former have more financial ability to do so. Higher education level is only 
significantly associated with higher probability of being asked for bribes, but more 
educated people are no more likely to pay bribes. This result is consistent with the 
expectation that more educated people may know what public services they are entitled 
to (Rose and Peiffer, 2014). Those that receive support from government assistance 
programs are more likely to find it justifiable to pay a bribe, which suggests the 
existence of bribery in the process of obtaining welfare in the Americas (Zechmeister, 
2014). 
Interestingly, social and political networks are consistently significant 
predictors of the higher likelihood of bribe solicitations as well as bribe payment22. 
Although there has been no theoretical explanation of the association between 
                                                             
22 Political networks appear to matter more (coefficient being significant at higher level) than social 
networks when it comes to bribe extortions. 
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belonging to social and political networks and being asked for bribes, one possible 
interpretation of the finding is that, in a society where corrupt behavior is the standard 
procedure, having networks does not seem to help a person avoid bribe solicitations. 
This finding also points to the direction that these networks may be used to find out 
whom to bribe and monitor if the bribe takers deliver the service (Rose and Peiffer, 
2014), which is contrary to the expectation by Putnam et al (1993) that such networks 
can help an individual to get access to services without having to pay bribes. The result, 
once again, reflects a particularistic culture, in which a person’s gain from the public 
sector depends on his/her connections, ability to bribe, and involvement in corrupt 
networks (Rothstein, 2011, p.238). As such, the social and political networks that one 
belongs to become one of the prerequisites for achieving benefits. In this case, besides 
acquiring access to the necessary services, the benefits also mean knowing who to bribe 
to get access to those services and being able to monitor service delivery.  
The relationship between how common a person perceives corruption to be and 
whether he/she actually pays bribes is insignificant, which is opposite to the argument 
that the more widespread corruption is perceived to be, the more likely he/she is to 
engage in it (Tavits, 2005). This finding reinforces the criticisms of using perception of 
corruption as an indication of individuals’ actual bribe payment (Rose and Peiffer, 
2013).  
Household income level is found to have no significant relationship with all the 
three outcomes. That means whether an individual is prone to corruption or not is 
independent of his/her household income level. This finding is against what Mocan 
(2004) and Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) found, i.e. richer people are more 
likely to be targeted for bribes and to pay bribes. It suggests that the relationship 
between income and corruption-related outcomes may not always play out at household 
level, but at country level as cross-national studies on corruption have pointed out.  
VII. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to explore whether and how remittance affects petty 
corruption (or bribery) in sending countries in order to clarify the ambiguous 
relationship between remittance and corruption. The main research question asked 
was: Are remittance recipients more likely to pay bribes than non-recipients? The results 
of the analysis indicated that those who receive remittances are more likely to think that 
paying a bribe is a justifiable act and be asked for bribes by public officials, but no more 
likely to actually pay bribes than those who do not receive remittances. The effect of 
remittance was rather consistent and significant regarding whether the recipients tend 
to justify paying bribes and be targeted for bribe extortions, even when the outlier Haiti 
was excluded. Yet, the relationship between remittance and bribe payment was not 
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robust to the exclusion of Haiti.   
The study contributes to the existing literature on several fronts. First, it used 
new data from the LAC to verify the findings by Ivlevs and King (2014) in the Balkan 
countries that receiving remittance increases the likelihood of justifying paying bribes 
and being solicited for bribes by public officials. Like Ivlevs and King (2014), I failed to 
find consistent supporting evidence that remittance recipients are significantly more 
prone to actual bribe payment than non-recipients in the LAC. However, rather than 
posing the research question as an empirical issue, this study went on to explain that the 
combination of limited or weak transmission of positive social remittance and the 
persistence of the particularistic culture shaping the way a corrupt society functions 
may impede behavioral change towards less petty corruption. 
Second, it confirmed findings of most of the studies on individual determinants 
of corruption, except those on income and perception of how common corruption is. 
These two variables were not found to have any significant relationship with bribe 
payment at individual level. The study also extended the literature in this field by 
investigating the role of remittance, a household/individual characteristic that has yet to 
be considered in previous research.  
Third, the study emphasized the importance of social remittance in control of 
corruption, which was neglected in several studies on (monetary) remittance and 
aggregate corruption. To study the impact of social remittance, the thesis shifted the 
focus from remittance senders as change agents in most of the previous research on 
remittance and corruption to remittance receivers. The findings suggest that the impact 
of monetary remittance on individual engagement in bribery is contingent on the 
circulation of social remittance, which in turns may depend on the contextual factors, for 
instance, the complex development of migration and remittance trend in the region and 
the level of economic development in the sending countries.  
The study has essential policy implications. First, it identifies that 
households/individuals receiving remittances from abroad are more likely to be 
exposed to bribe solicitations (Ivlevs and King, 2014). Corruption prevention policies, 
therefore, can be directed towards this group of people. As an example, more attention 
can be paid to monitoring transactions between public service providers and individuals 
with migrant connections. The purpose is to assure migrants that the money they sent 
home would not end up in the wrong pockets and, importantly, encourage them to 
maintain the remittance flows. This action is vital in the context of sending countries 
implementing more and more policies to harness the benefits of remittance for 
development (Tyburski, 2012, p.339).  
Furthermore, the research findings illustrate the conclusion by de Haas (2007) 
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that remittance is no panacea for development. The research has shown that it is of 
utmost significance to tackle the root of corruption, which is particularism, while 
simultaneously improving the households’ living standards. In order to do this, top-
down structural changes are required (Rothstein, 2011). The combination of monetary 
and social remittance alone as a bottom-up solution to corruption may not work without 
these changes, which fall under the responsibilities of the state.  
The study suffers from several limitations both from theoretical and 
methodological aspects. The role of specific country contexts as alternative explanations 
for perpetuating corruption, including but not limited to crime level, law enforcement 
(Zechmeister, 2014), level of economic development (Treisman, 2000), the degree of 
female participation in government (Dollar et al., 2001), political institutions (Gerring 
and Thacker, 2004; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2003; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; 
Persson et al, 2003; Chang and Golden, 2007), has not been considered. As the current 
data has no country-level variables, the empirical results in this study indicate that there 
is no need to proceed to multilevel model with level-2 variables. Nevertheless, if new 
data on these variables are added, it is totally possible to explore in this direction. In 
addition, more real-life examples, especially on remittance recipients’ experience of 
bribe solicitations and how the transmission of social remittances helps fight petty 
corruption, can be beneficial to strengthen the arguments in my theoretical framework. 
Up to now, it has been quite difficult to find those examples partly because the studies 
on remittance so far have only focused on remittance senders rather than remittance 
receivers as agents of change. 
The thesis also has several methodological issues. As discussed above, due to 
technical limitations of SPSS, the study has not dealt with the problems of missing values 
and endogeneity, though it is unclear whether they are serious issues here. 
Notwithstanding its popularity among social science researchers, SPSS does not appear 
to be the best statistical program to handle multilevel models with categorical outcomes 
and complex sampling strategy. Besides, additional independent variables, as outlined 
earlier, can be useful to elaborate how monetary remittances facilitate the transmission 
of social remittances. 
Future research can close the above-mentioned gaps by expanding the 
multilevel model to include level-2 predictors. The role of contextual factors, such as the 
level of economic development, can be studied as direct effects on petty corruption 
and/or, as indicated earlier, moderating effects on the relationship between remittance 
and petty corruption. It is also very useful to document more case studies, not only in 
the outlier country, Haiti, but in other countries/regions as well to verify the 
mechanisms of the relationship between remittances and bribery. To overcome the 
endogeneity problem, the time dimension, i.e. how social remittances and the 
relationship between remittances and corruption experiences change over time, can be 
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explored. However, it may be quite demanding for data collection because large surveys 
currently do not follow the same households/individuals across several time periods.  
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Annex 1: List of countries included in the analysis 
 
Countries 
Sample size 
(respondents) 
Geographical 
position 
GDP per 
capita 
2014 
(US$) 
Income 
group 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
2014 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
2014 
Mexico 1 336 
Central 
America 
10 325.6 
Upper 
middle 
1.9% 35 
Guatemala 1 297 
Central 
America 
3 673.1 
Low 
middle 
9.9% 32 
El Salvador 1 317 
Central 
America 
4 120.0 
Low 
middle 
16.8% 39 
Honduras 1 313 
Central 
America 
2 434.8 
Low 
middle 
17.8% 29 
Nicaragua  1 403 
Central 
America 
1 963.1 
Low 
middle 
9.7% 28 
Panama 1 273 
Central 
America 
11 948.9 
Upper 
middle 
1.6% 37 
Dominican 
Republic 
1 337 Caribbean 6 163.6 
Upper 
middle 
7.5% 32 
Haiti 1 248 Caribbean 824.2 Low 22.4% 19 
Jamaica 1 302 Caribbean 5 104.8 
Upper 
middle 
15.7% 38 
Guyana 1 298 Caribbean 4 053.9 
Low 
middle 
10.2% 30 
Belize 1 296 Caribbean 4 831.2 
Upper 
middle 
4.9% N/Aa 
Colombia 1 326 
Andean -
Southern Cone 
7 903.9 
Upper 
middle 
1.1% 37 
Peru 1 360 
Andean - 
Southern Cone 
6 541.0 
Upper 
middle 
1.3% 38 
Paraguay 1 399 
Andean - 
Southern Cone 
4 712.8 
Upper 
middle 
1.9% 24 
Uruguay 1 288 
Andean - 
Southern Cone 
16 806.8 High 0.2% 73 
Brazil 1 356 
Andean - 
Southern Cone 
11 384.4 
Upper 
middle 
0.1% 43 
 
Source: Geographical position – AmericasBarometer 2014 Sample Design 
(http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-designs.php); GDP per capita data from World Development 
Indicators; Income group data from the World Bank’s country classifications; Remittance data from the 
World Bank; and Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International (0-highly corrupt, 100-very 
clean). 
a - N/A = Not available 
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Annex 2: List of variables 
 
Variable 
Name 
Variable label Description Data source 
paid_bribe Paid bribe Categorical variable to measure 
respondent’s behaviour related to bribe 
payment. It has two categories: 0 people 
who were in contact with at least one of 
those institutions but did not pay a 
bribe; and 1 = people who bribed at least 
one of the public service providers. 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, questions  
exc11, exc13, exc14, 
exc 15, exc16. 
justify_bribe Justifying 
paying bribes 
Dichotomous variable to measure 
individual attitude towards petty 
corruption, based on the question “Do 
you think given the way things are, 
sometimes paying a bribe is justified?” (0 
– No, 1 – Yes).  
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question 
exc18.  
asked_bribe Being asked 
for bribe 
Dichotomous variable to measure 
whether the respondent was asked for a 
bribe by a police officer, a government 
employee or a soldier/military officer in 
the last twelve months (0 – No, 1 – Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, questions  
exc2, exc6, exc20. 
remittance Receiving 
remittance 
Dichotomous variable to measure 
whether respondent’s household 
receives any remittance from abroad, 
based on the question “Do you or 
someone else living in your household 
receive remittances (financial support), 
that is, economic assistance from 
abroad?” (0 – No, 1 – Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question q10a. 
hhinc Household 
monthly 
income level 
Categorical variable to measure the 
respondent’s monthly household income 
level. It has three categories: 1 - low, 2 - 
middle, 3 - high.  
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question 
q10new. 
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Variable 
Name 
Variable label Description Data source 
percep Perception of 
the spread of 
corruption 
Categorical variable to measure how 
widespread the respondent perceives 
corruption to be. It has four categories:  
1 - Very uncommon, 2 - Uncommon, 3 - 
Common, 4 - Very common.  
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question  exc7. 
polcap Political 
networks 
Binary variable to measure whether a 
person is involved in political networks, 
based on information from four 
questions on whether the respondent 
requested help from a public official in 
municipality or local government, 
whether he/she attended the town or 
city council meetings in the last twelve 
months, and how often he/she attended 
meetings of a political party or political 
organization (0 – No, 1 – Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, questions np1, 
np2, cp4a, cp13. 
soccap Social 
networks 
Binary variable to measure whether a 
person is involved in social networks, 
based on the questions related to the 
respondent’s participation in solving a 
problem in the community, attendance 
at meetings of different associations 
(religious, parent, community 
improvement committee) (0 – No, 1 – 
Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, questions cp5, 
cp6, cp7, cp8. 
gender Gender Dichotomous variable for respondent’s 
ender (0 – male, 1 - female). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question q1. 
age60 Age over 60 Dichotomous variable to measure 
whether respondent is over 60 years old 
or not (0 – No, 1 – Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question q2. 
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Variable 
Name 
Variable label Description Data source 
ed Education 
level 
Categorical variable for respondent’s 
education level (0 - no education, 1 - 
primary, 2 - secondary, 3 - tertiary and 
above). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question ed. 
occup Employment 
status 
Dichotomous variable to measure 
whether respondent has a paid job or 
not (0 – No, 1 – Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question 
occup4a. 
wf1 Beneficiary of 
government 
programs 
Binary variable to measure whether 
anyone in the household is a beneficiary 
of government assistance programs or 
not (0 – No, 1 – Yes). 
AmericasBarometer 
2014, question wf1. 
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Annex 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Paid bribe 21148 0 1 0.1339 0.34057 
Justifying paying bribes 18108 0 1 0.1930 0.39467 
Being asked for bribe 21119 0 1 0.1459 0.35305 
Receiving remittances 20981 0 1 0.1494 0.35646 
Household monthly 
income level 
18195 1 3 2.1359 0.81961 
Perception of the spread 
of corruption 
18945 1 4 3.1861 0.84258 
Political networks 21149 0 1 0.3986 0.48961 
Social networks 21145 0 1 0.8513 0.35579 
Gender 21149 0 1 0.4945 0.49998 
Age over 60 21124 0 1 0.1088 0.31138 
Education level 21089 0 3 1.8182 0.75848 
Employment status 21101 0 1 0.5733 0.49460 
Beneficiary of 
government program(s) 
21007 0 1 0.1224 0.32774 
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Annex 4: Diagnostics 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
Collinearity Statistics 
Model 
DV: Being asked for 
bribes 
DV: Justifying paying 
bribes 
DV: Paid bribes 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Receiving 
remittances 
0.983 1.017 0.984 1.016 0.983 1.017 
Household 
monthly income 
level 
0.838 1.194 0.846 1.183 0.838 1.194 
Perception of the 
spread of 
corruption 
0.982 1.018 0.984 1.016 0.982 1.018 
Political 
networks 
0.958 1.043 0.957 1.045 0.958 1.043 
Social networks 0.955 1.047 0.953 1.050 0.955 1.047 
Gender 0.852 1.173 0.857 1.167 0.852 1.173 
Age over 60 0.933 1.072 0.929 1.076 0.933 1.072 
Education level 0.833 1.200 0.839 1.192 0.833 1.200 
Employment 
status 
0.822 1.217 0.827 1.209 0.822 1.217 
Beneficiary of 
government 
program(s) 
0.975 1.025 0.973 1.028 0.975 1.025 
 
 
 
Outliers 
Note: As it is not possible to display the country names on the plot, the dots representing the countries are 
cross-checked with the case numbers of the respondents that belong to each country.  
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Annex 5: Results without robust standard errors 
 
 
Table 4 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of justifying 
paying bribes 
Model 
(10) (11) (12) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
  0.183*** 1.201   
 
 
(0.060)   
 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  0.071 1.074 0.071 1.074 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  
High 
  0.138* 1.148 0.138* 1.148 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  0.223 1.249 0.223 1.249 
  (0.128)  (0.128)  
Common 
  0.186 1.205 0.186 1.205 
  (0.121)  (0.121)  
Very common 
  0.418*** 1.519 0.418*** 1.519 
  (0.120)  (0.120)  
Political 
networks 
  0.102* 1.108 0.102* 1.108 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  
Social networks 
  -0.033 0.967 -0.033 0.967 
  (0.065)  (0.065)  
Gender 
  -0.316*** 0.729 -0.316*** 0.729 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  
Age over 60 
  -0.433*** 0.648 -0.433*** 0.648 
  (0.086)  (0.086)  
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Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
Primary 
  -0.087 0.917 -0.087 0.917 
  (0.152)  (0.152)  
Secondary 
  0.221 1.248 0.221 1.248 
  (0.150)  (0.150)  
Tertiary 
  0.205 1.228 0.205 1.228 
  (0.158)  (0.158)  
Employment 
status 
  0.011 1.011 0.011 1.011 
  (0.049)  (0.049)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.209** 1.232 0.209** 1.232 
 
 
(0.066)  (0.066)  
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-1.512*** 0.220 -1.888*** 0.151 -1.888*** 0.151 
(0.163) 
 
(0.260)  (0.260)  
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
    0.183*** 1.201 
 
 
  (0.060) 
 
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.364*  0.379*  0.379*  
(0.145)  (0.152)  (0.152)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0a  
      
ICCb 0.099  0.103  0.103  
Akaike 
Correctedc 
87058.002  71333.498  71335.498  
N (level 1) 18108  14695  14695  
N (level 2) 16  16  16  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. (Normal) Standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS automatically set this parameter as redundant. 
b – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
c – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
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Table 5 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of being asked 
for bribes 
Model 
(13) (14) (15) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
  0.341*** 1.406   
 
 
(0.066)   
 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  0.018 1.018 0.021 1.021 
  (0.065)  (0.065)  
High 
  0.199** 1.220 0.202** 1.223 
  (0.064)  (0.064)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  -0.260* 0.771 -0.254 0.776 
  (0.131)  (0.131)  
Common 
  -0.261* 0.770 -0.257* 0.773 
  (0.122)  (0.122)  
Very common 
  0.116 1.123 0.123 1.131 
  (0.120)  (0.120)  
Political 
networks 
  0.449*** 1.566 0.449*** 1.567 
  (0.047)  (0.047)  
Social networks 
  0.246** 1.279 0.242** 1.274 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  
Gender 
  -0.710*** 0.491 -0.711*** 0.491 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  
Age over 60 
  -0.565*** 0.569 -0.566*** 0.568 
  (0.095)  (0.095)  
Education level       
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No education   Ref.  Ref.  
Primary 
  0.120 1.128 0.120 1.127 
  (0.159)  (0.159)  
Secondary 
  0.558*** 1.746 0.555*** 1.742 
  (0.158)  (0.158)  
Tertiary 
  0.864*** 2.373 0.856*** 2.354 
  (0.165)  (0.165)  
Employment 
status 
  0.094 1.099 0.097 1.101 
  (0.052)  (0.053)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.228** 1.251 0.227** 1.254 
 
 
(0.070)  (0.070) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-1.861*** 0.156 -2.509*** 0.081 -2.500*** 0.082 
(0.138) 
 
(0.250)  (0.252) 
 
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
    0.359** 1.431 
 
 
  (0.105) 
 
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.299**  0.292*  0.263*  
(0.112)  (0.115)  (0.116)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.044  
    (0.035)  
ICCa 0.083  0.081  0.074  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
105909.638  81537.657  81532.442  
N (level 1) 21119  16011  16011  
N (level 2) 16  16  16  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. (Normal) Standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
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Table 6 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of paying 
bribes 
Model 
(16) (17) (18) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
  0.234** 1.263   
 
 
(0.080)   
 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  -0.070 0.933 -0.068 0.934 
  (0.073)  (0.073)  
High 
  -0.125 0.882 -0.116 0.890 
  (0.075)  (0.075)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  -0.212 0.809 -0.194 0.823 
  (0.152)  (0.152)  
Common 
  -0.266 0.767 -0.255 0.775 
  (0.143)  (0.143)  
Very common 
  0.064 1.066 0.084 1.087 
  (0.141)  (0.141)  
Political 
networks 
  0.566*** 1.762 0.563*** 1.756 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  
Social networks 
  0.398*** 1.489 0.390*** 1.478 
  (0.097)  (0.097)  
Gender 
  -0.146* 0.864 -0.148* 0.863 
  (0.060)  (0.060)  
Age over 60 
  -0.175 0.839 -0.178 0.837 
  (0.100)  (0.100)  
Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
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Primary 
  -0.135 0.874 -0.138 0.871 
  (0.153)  (0.153)  
Secondary 
  -0.111 0.895 -0.112 0.894 
  (0.154)  (0.154)  
Tertiary 
  -0.096 0.908 -0.114 0.892 
  (0.166)  (0.166)  
Employment 
status 
  0.199** 1.221 0.198** 1.219 
  (0.063)  (0.063)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.113 1.120 0.107 1.113 
 
 
(0.084)  (0.084) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-2.150*** 0.117 -2.549*** 0.078 -2.543*** 0.079 
(0.272) 
 
(0.376)  (0.384) 
 
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
    0.273 1.314 
 
 
  (0.149) 
 
Variance 
(intercept) 
1.174**  1.364**  1.352*  
(0.432)  (0.521)  (0.538)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.102  
    (0.060)  
ICCa 0.262  0.293  0.291  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
113604.845  87700.589  87678.333  
N (level 1) 21148  16028  16028  
N (level 2) 16  16  16  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. (Normal) Standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
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Annex 6: Results without outlier (Haiti) 
 
 
Table 7 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of justifying 
paying bribes 
Model 
(19) (20) (21) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
  0.207*** 1.230   
 
 
(0.057)   
 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  0.028 1.029 0.029 1.029 
  (0.075)  (0.075)  
High 
  0.088 1.092 0.089 1.094 
  (0.098)  (0.098)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  0.136 1.146 0.136 1.146 
  (0.139)  (0.139)  
Common 
  0.103 1.108 0.104 1.109 
  (0.153)  (0.154)  
Very common 
  0.366* 1.443 0.368* 1.445 
  (0.171)  (0.171)  
Political 
networks 
  0.094 1.099 0.094 1.098 
  (0.079)  (0.079)  
Social networks 
  -0.028 0.973 -0.029 0.971 
  (0.100)  (0.099)  
Gender 
  -0.369*** 0.691 -0.369*** 0.691 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  
Age over 60 
  -0.521*** 0.594 -0.522*** 0.593 
  (0.112)  (0.112)  
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Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
Primary 
  -0.012 0.988 -0.012 0.988 
  (0.151)  (0.150)  
Secondary 
  0.298 1.347 0.299 1.348 
  (0.167)  (0.167)  
Tertiary 
  0.275* 1.317 0.275* 1.317 
  (0.140)  (0.139)  
Employment 
status 
  -0.046 0.955 -0.047 0.954 
  (0.046)  (0.046)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.192** 1.212 0.191** 1.211 
 
 
(0.072)  (0.071) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-1.619*** 0.198 -1.919*** 0.147 -1.920*** 0.147 
(0.126) 
 
(0.322)  (0.322) 
 
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
    0.229** 1.257 
 
 
  (0.069) 
 
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.218*  0.173*  0.159  
(0.091)  (0.074)  (0.081)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.009  
    (0.032)  
ICCa 0.062  0.049  0.046  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
82174.006  68336.023  68334.749  
N (level 1) 16958  13979  13979  
N (level 2) 15  15  15  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
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Table 8 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of being asked 
for bribes 
Model 
(22) (23) (24) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
  0.382*** 1.465   
 
 
(0.080)   
 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  -0.003 0.997 -0.002 0.998 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  
High 
  0.167 1.182 0.170 1.185 
  (0.098)  (0.095)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  -0.288** 0.750 -0.280** 0.756 
  (0.095)  (0.093)  
Common 
  -0.284 0.753 -0.279 0.757 
  (0.158)  (0.160)  
Very common 
  0.087 1.091 0.095 1.100 
  (0.137)  (0.138)  
Political 
networks 
  0.442*** 1.555 0.441*** 1.554 
  (0.088)  (0.087)  
Social networks 
  0.265* 1.304 0.261* 1.298 
  (0.116)  (0.114)  
Gender 
  -0.752*** 0.471 -0.754*** 0.471 
  (0.079)  (0.079)  
Age over 60 
  -0.584*** 0.558 -0.586*** 0.557 
  (0.078)  (0.079)  
Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
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Primary 
  0.103 1.108 0.102 1.107 
  (0.129)  (0.131)  
Secondary 
  0.554*** 1.740 0.551*** 1.735 
  (0.117)  (0.117)  
Tertiary 
  0.846*** 2.330 0.835*** 2.305 
  (0.148)  (0.151)  
Employment 
status 
  0.070 1.073 0.070 1.073 
  (0.051)  (0.052)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.191 1.211 0.193 1.212 
 
 
(0.120)  (0.119) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-1.863*** 0.155 -2.425*** 0.088 -2.419*** 0.089 
(0.143) 
 
(0.202)  (0.200)  
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
    0.397*** 1.487 
 
 
  (0.104) 
 
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.321*  0.315*  0.285*  
(0.125)  (0.128)  (0.129)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.043  
    (0.037)  
ICCa 0.088  0.087  0.079  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
99808.447  77778.228  77769.518  
N (level 1) 19887  15250  15250  
N (level 2) 15  15  15  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
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Table 9 – The impacts of remittances on the propensity of paying 
bribes 
Model 
(25) (26) (27) 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
Fixed effects       
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
  0.205 1.228   
 
 
(0.139)   
 
Household 
monthly income 
 
 
   
 
Low   Ref.  Ref.  
Middle 
  -0.083 0.920 -0.081 0.923 
  (0.085)  (0.085)  
High 
  -0.104 0.901 -0.094 0.910 
  (0.089)  (0.084)  
Perception of 
corruption 
 
 
   
 
Very uncommon   Ref.  Ref.  
Uncommon 
  -0.169 0.845 -0.150 0.861 
  (0.121)  (0.125)  
Common 
  -0.144 0.866 -0.131 0.878 
  (0.204)  (0.211)  
Very common 
  0.162 1.176 0.182 1.200 
  (0.189)  (0.195)  
Political 
networks 
  0.576*** 1.778 0.572*** 1.773 
  (0.094)  (0.092)  
Social networks 
  0.406*** 1.500 0.395*** 1.485 
  (0.090)  (0.086)  
Gender 
  -0.192*** 0.825 -0.194*** 0.824 
  (0.043)  (0.042)  
Age over 60 
  -0.257** 0.773 -0.259** 0.772 
  (0.081)  (0.080)  
Education level       
No education   Ref.  Ref.  
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Primary 
  -0.168 0.845 -0.171 0.843 
  (0.157)  (0.160)  
Secondary 
  -0.135 0.873 -0.135 0.874 
  (0.123)  (0.124)  
Tertiary 
  -0.116 0.890 -0.135 0.874 
  (0.107)  (0.109)  
Employment 
status 
  0.171*** 1.186 0.170*** 1.185 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  
Beneficiary of 
government 
program 
  0.100 1.105 0.095 1.100 
 
 
(0.135)  (0.132) 
 
Random effects       
Constant 
(country 
intercepts) 
-2.382*** 0.092 -2.847*** 0.061 -2.846*** 0.058 
(0.128) 
 
(0.323)  (0.324) 
 
Receiving 
remittances (0-
1) 
    0.265 1.303 
 
 
  (0.159) 
 
Variance 
(intercept) 
0.251*  0.228*  0.212  
(0.102)  (0.097)  (0.121)  
Variance 
(remittance) 
    0.108  
    (0.066)  
ICCa 0.070  0.064  0.060  
Akaike 
Correctedb 
107492.222  83718.744  83754.321  
N (level 1) 19901  15257  15257  
N (level 2) 15  15  15  
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Odd ratios bigger than 1 denotes a 
positive relationship, odd ratios smaller than 1 means a negative relationship and odd ratios equal to 1 
means no relationship. 
a – SPSS provides variance (         
  figures, but not ICC results. ICC was then calculated based on the 
formula in Heck et al (2012, p.157):     
        
 
         
         
  
 
        
 
        
            
 
b – Akaike Corrected is an information criterion calculated based on the -2 log pseudo likelihood and is 
used to compare models. Models with smaller information criterion values fit better.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2014. 
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The scatterplot with Haiti 
 
The scatterplot without Haiti 
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Annex 7: Missing data patterns 
 
The analysis of missing data can be implemented by the Multiple Imputation 
component, Analyze Patterns, in SPSS version 23. The following pie charts indicate the 
percentage of missing variables, cases and individual cells that have at least one missing 
value. The Variables pie shows that 11 variables (84.62% of those included in the 
analysis) have at least one missing value. The Cases pie demonstrates that 6,470 
(30.59%) of the 21,149 cases contain at least one missing value. In the Values pie, about 
3.1% of all values are missing. 
 
 
Below is the list of variables having at least 0.01% values to be missing, in the 
order from highest to lowest number of missing values. Three variables, paid bribe, 
political networks and gender, are not included in this table because they do not contain 
any missing values. 
 
Variable Summarya,b 
 
Missing 
Valid N N Percent 
Justify paying bribe 3041 14.4% 18108 
Household monthly income level 2954 14.0% 18195 
Perception of the spread of 
corruption 
2204 10.4% 18945 
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Receiving remittances 168 0.8% 20981 
Beneficiary of government 
program(s) 
142 0.7% 21007 
Education level 60 0.3% 21089 
Employment status 48 0.2% 21101 
Being asked for bribe 30 0.1% 21119 
Age over 60 25 0.1% 21124 
Social networks 4 0.0% 21145 
a. Maximum number of variables shown: 25 
b. Minimum percentage of missing values for variable to be included: 0.0% 
 
 
 
